Psychological warfare has a key part in coalition tactics, reports Deaglán de Bréadún.
There is a sign in the Coalition Media Centre in Doha, capital of Qatar, which reads: "If you find yourself in a fair fight, you didn't plan your mission properly."
It provides an insight into the mental attitude behind US preparation for the war in Iraq: plan the campaign meticulously and use overwhelming force to achieve your goals.
But yesterday, when many expected a hail of destruction to be unleashed on the Iraqi capital, it did not happen - initially at least.
Along with the threat of overwhelming force, psychological warfare is a major element of coalition strategy. Some two million leaflets have been dropped on Iraq, urging surrender and co-operation with the invading forces.
I came across a friendly but highly-reticent US special operations officer this week who had been on a mission inside Iraq apparently involving "freedom broadcasts" to the population.
The aim of psychological warfare is to soften up the population and/or the leadership for surrender or mere token resistance. Indeed, the threat of extreme force is itself intended to have a psychological effect.
It does not appear to be working at leadership level. The reported defection of Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, turned out to be false: this most westernised member of the country's top echelons is standing by his leader, at least up to now.
While there are obvious potential gains to be made from persuading the Iraqi population that the sky is about to fall in on them, there is a contradictory requirement to prepare US public opinion for the possibility that victory might not be as easy as originally stated.
President Bush changed the "mood music" in his speech immediately after the attack on Saddam when he said: "A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict."
It was, as one seasoned analyst put it, "almost a U-turn" for the allies. The suggestion up to now has been that this would be a short, sharp conflict, lasting days and at most weeks.
Local observers here in Qatar, where the allied command centre is located, are in no doubt that Saddam's Republican Guard, numbering some 100,000, will put up a street-by-street, door-to-door fight to hold Baghdad or at least slow down the allied advance. Even the southern city of Basra might not fall quite as easily as some suggest.
The coming weeks will reveal whether or not the allies have underestimated the depth and strength of Iraqi nationalism and the true level of support Saddam still retains.