Decision brings saga to a close

The most positive aspect of the DRA ruling on what had become known as the Mark Vaughan case is that it issued more quickly than expected and that it brings the contentious matter to a close.

Less happy is the fact that such closure is more a product of St Brigid's forbearance in not seeking redress in the courts than of any sense the outcome is correct.

There is also the uneasy feeling that a body formed to hear disputes and prevent them from being brought to litigation has now become a rule-making body, whose decisions on its own assertion can only be overturned in the High Court.

Ironically, the most satisfactory high-profile ruling delivered by the new body was the original clarification of Vaughan's position. Closely argued and lucid, it appeared to show up an anomaly in the GAA's rules on suspensions and would have been a useful guide to resolving the situation - except that the rule book was incorrect. Had it properly incorporated a decision of the 1996 Congress, the Official Guide couldn't have been taken to support Kilmacud's case.

There are reasons to agree with much of the latest DRA ruling. The procedural objections by St Brigid's were never the strongest shot in their locker when objecting to their "defeat" last May, and the authority's arguments in dismissing them are generally reasonable.

The crux of the matter, however, and the most influential argument in St Brigid's case is the matter of the rules.

In answer to this the DRA state that the 1996 amendment and a 1977 ruling of Central Council were never put to them. In fact Liam O'Neill, Leinster chair but representing Central Council at the original hearing, had tried to fetch supporting documentation from his car but wasn't allowed. Again this can be accepted as reasonable procedure: in other words get your ducks in a row before coming to a hearing.

What isn't reasonable is the contention that the original decision isn't patently wrong. The decision states at paragraphs 47) and 48): "We, of course, accept that in principle it is possible that an arbitration award might be made which is patently wrong. We further appreciate that it would obviously be unsatisfactory if that award could never be set aside or corrected "We are quite satisfied, however, that the facts of the present case do not even come close to the exceptional circumstances which would justify such a course of action. This is not a case where some newly discovered or fresh evidence came to light subsequent to the award." This is confusing.

On the one hand supporting evidence that should have impacted radically on the decision wasn't allowed; yet conversely that excluded evidence is treated as if it was already considered.

More seriously, the final paragraph attempts to dismiss the evidence that wasn't admitted by questioning the applicability of the 1996 amendment and suggesting there is some requirement for the rules to be published before they become operative.

According to paragraph 51): "Under Rule 9, there was a requirement that the Rules of the Association be printed in Irish and English.

"Reference is also made to the provision of Rule 79 in relation to rule drafting. The clear implication of this rule seems to be that amendments should be incorporated in a new printed version of the rule concerned."

These are selective citations. Rule 9 simply gives precedence to the Irish version of any rule in case of conflict between the two versions. Rule 79 on the other hand refers to the sub-committee charged with incorporating motions into the Official Guide but includes the essential clause, "without derogating from their meaning".

The only way of amending or introducing rules is to have them passed at congress. Clearly the Official Guide subsequent to 1996 has derogated from the meaning of the motion passed that year.