US courts the new Europe, snubs the old

WORLD VIEW: The German position is seen to foreshadow a stronger axis within the EU on foreign policy issues, writes Paul Gillespie.

Europe old and new has become part of the political and diplomatic endgame ahead of a probable US-led war.

Last week Donald Rumsfeld took the limelight when he told a reporter: "You are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire Europe today the centre of gravity is shifting to the east. You look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They are not with France and Germany on this. They are with the United States."

He was responding to the statement by French and German leaders that they would oppose unilateral US action and stand by the Security Council as the sole source of legitimacy on whether to authorise military action against Iraq.

This week Rumsfeld seemed to be confirmed by the publication of a letter signed by eight heads of state or government from Spain, the UK, Italy, Denmark and Portugal in the west and Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in the east. Bertie Ahern says he would have signed an amended version had he been asked.

The letter argued that Europe and the US must stand united in shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and affirmed their wish to pursue the UN route and support the Security Council. But it insisted the Security Council "must maintain its credibility by ensuring international peace and security. We cannot allow a dictator to systematically violate these resolutions . . . We are confident that the Security Council will face up to its responsibilities."

This formulation neatly avoids the question of whether they believe another Security Council resolution is required to mandate military action against Iraq, although Tony Blair, who meets Bush this weekend, thinks it is desirable.

It is compatible with Bush administration warnings that the UN's will in upholding its credibility could be corrupted by opportunistic votes or vetoes, possibly by France with Chinese or Russian support. On this account the US and its allies have a better insight into the needs of world security.

The German position that it is fully behind France has rattled Washington. It is seen to foreshadow a stronger axis within the EU on foreign policy issues. This developing framework is an essential backdrop to these events, making this week one of the most important in transatlantic relations for years.

Publication of the letter was widely seen as betraying the gradual search for unity among EU states; only the Dutch refused to sign it. But given the perceived arrogance of France and Germany among those who signed the letter this is probably not surprising. Except for the British, the other Western state signatories are on the centre-right, but the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians have new left-wing governments.

One of the principal goals of US policy since the end of the Cold War has been to maintain a security and political foothold in Europe, even as NATO's military role diminished. This has been accomplished mainly through adapting and enlarging NATO, on the assumption the alliance will continue to reflect American primacy.

Adaptation has seen NATO create a much more inclusive political framework through the Partnership for Peace involving nearly all the neutral and former Warsaw Pact states. It now shares resources with the EU's security and military apparatus, including the 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force.

Enlarging NATO to take in many of the old Warsaw Pact states has given the US extra political leverage in lobbying for support over Iraq. Rumsfeld's reference to old and new Europe prompts the question of how much US diplomacy had to do with initiating this week's letter.

Judy Dempsey reported in the Financial Times on Monday that US diplomats have been lobbying hard against the deepening Franco-German alliance. They fear it will lead to a more independent European defence and foreign policy which would transform transatlantic relations.

If these efforts are successful, the weaknesses and divisions so evident in EU attitudes this week would be overcome. This episode may, indeed, strengthen them, especially if there is another UN resolution with which most can agree, even if it does lead to a war.

Dempsey quoted an EU military officer as saying: "It is not really the 'old Europe' that worries Rumsfeld. It is the 'new Europe' that France and Germany are creating."

Two aspects of that plan particularly worry the US. The first concerns proposals to set up a European defence agency to co-ordinate and streamline military spending, research and production. This is likely to succeed, not least because it is backed by the UK; it would tend to exclude the US from EU arms markets.

The second would see an end to the national veto in questions of EU foreign policy. This is gaining widespread support in the Convention on the Future of Europe, along with plans to create a European foreign minister.

Qualified majority voting would certainly sharpen and define EU foreign policy. If this happened US officials could no longer work mainly at a bilateral, country-by-country level, but would have to do more of their lobbying in Brussels, which would be more difficult for them. A strengthened EU presidency system would have the same effect.

It is tempting, indeed instructive, to examine the Iraqi crisis through the lens of such a new system. It seems certain that it would have reached a much more focused EU policy and a greater determination to ensure a central role for the UN.