Unionists should keep their eyes on the prize

Unionists are right to be sceptical about assurances that there will be a start to IRA decommissioning before the end of January, and a completion by the end of May. Indeed, they are right to be sceptical that there will ever be any IRA decommissioning.

They may also be right to be sceptical about an end for all time to IRA violence - paramilitary organisations do not wind down so neatly - and they are certainly right to view with scepticism, if not disbelief, assurances given to them by the British government and, in particular, the "fail-safe" procedure Peter Mandelson spoke about in the House of Commons on Monday.

Mandelson said: "If there is default, either in implementing decommissioning, or, indeed, for that matter, devolution, it is understood that the two governments, British and Irish, will take the steps necessary to cease immediately the operation of the institutions - the executive, the Assembly, the North-South ministerial council, the British-Irish Council, the Civic Forum and the North-South implementation bodies." He went on to say: "I would not shrink from suspending the institutions if it proved necessary, thus restoring the status quo, so as to consider how to rectify the default (on decommissioning)." As Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson has no authority to suspend any institution, so that part of his statement is a nonsense. But the two governments together could abrogate the treaty they both entered into following the Belfast Agreement and could repeal the legislation establishing the institutions concerned. That is if they agreed upon that.

Last July, the governments issued a joint document, The Way Forward, in which reference was made to a "fail-safe" arrangement. This stated: "If commitments under the agreement are not met, either in relation to decommissioning or devolution, they will automatically, and with immediate effect, suspend the operation of the institutions set up by the agreement." It continued: "In relation to decommissioning, this action will be taken on receipt of a report at any time that the commitments now being entered into or steps which are subsequently laid down by the commission are not fulfilled in accordance with the Good Friday agreement." Now this might have meant something or it might have meant nothing at all.

The only commitments of relevance made under the Belfast Agreement on the part of Sinn Fein was that it would use its best endeavours to bring about decommissioning. If, however, during the course of the secret discussions with Sinn Fein in July, the party committed itself to securing de commissioning by a certain date, it would be a different matter, but Sinn Fein leaders have stated repeatedly that they cannot do this, so it is unlikely that they gave any such guarantees.

In the House of Commons on July 13th, then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, said: "The North-South ministerial council and the British-Irish council will cease to function under the terms of a supplementary treaty between the two governments. The draft treaty is available in the library of the House."

Mandelson was asked on Monday by Robert McCartney about this draft treaty, which, apparently, was outlined in an exchange of letters between Mowlam and David Andrews. He said the treaty was not pursued because the plan fell through. However, he said "a similar understanding with the Irish Government exists".

Yesterday I asked the Department of Foreign Affairs for a copy of the letters in which the draft treaty was outlined. As far as the Department is concerned, the letters are secret, although they were placed in the library of the House of Commons - British MPs are entitled to know what our Government has agreed to but the citizens of Ireland are not.

The reason for the secrecy is obvious. Either this draft treaty runs counter to the Belfast Agreement in requiring Sinn Fein to meet demands which manifestly are not required of it under the agreement (i.e., to secure decommissioning, rather than do its best to bring it about), or the draft treaty simply repeats the demands of the agreement, in which case it is of no comfort to the unionists.

Bertie Ahern added to this ambiguity yesterday afternoon by stating: "Where the agreement was in significant respects not being implemented, the Government would have to step in and assume their responsibilities, including through appropriate suspension arrangements." As for the possibility of actual decommissioning, they are right to be sceptical about this as well. The IRA has said nothing at all to suggest that it has abandoned its hitherto adamant rejection of decommissioning.

If all that was at stake was decommissioning and assurances by two governments, the unionists would be right to reject what is on offer. But it is not. If unionists thought back to what they regarded as important, say, 10 years ago, they might agree it was the following: a guarantee of a continuance of the Union for as long as a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wanted this to be (coupled with a recognition of this in the Irish Constitution), peace on the streets and an end of fear and intimidation; the devolution of power back to Northern Ireland and an end of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was negotiated over their heads.

They have now secured all of these objectives. The Union is guaranteed by the British government and by the change to the Irish Constitution that was for so long demanded. But, more than that, nationalists and republicans have now accepted the principle of consent and, in doing so, effectively abandoned nationalism (no longer do Irish nationalists insist that the future of Ireland be determined by the people of Ireland as a whole). This is a huge sea change which has not been adequately appreciated by unionists. On the issue of most importance to unionists, unionists have won hands down.

It would be a pity if unionists were to reject what is for them a good deal because it is not the best deal conceivable (as an ideologue of some unionists argued, "the best is often the enemy of the good"). It would be especially unfortunate if they rejected this because the two governments fail to appreciate it is not always necessarily a bad idea to tell the truth.