Three crucial phases to campaign against Gadafy

Operating the no-fly zone is predictable in the short term, but its duration raises questions

THE US Africa Command (Africom) is co-ordinating the no-fly zone over Libya with an emerging coalition of forces including Britain, Canada, France, Denmark, Italy, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The operation, labelled Odyssey Dawn by the US, will initially consist of three distinct phases.

The first phase is under way with a mix of cruise missile attacks and air strikes on key Libyan targets. These targets include military radar, command, control and communication sites around Tripoli and Misratah along the Mediterranean coastline.

The destruction of these primary radar and signals facilities will have a two-fold effect.

It will rob Gadafy’s regime of the ability to navigate its own airspace and deny it the ability to launch co-ordinated counterattacks against the coalition with Libyan aircraft or missile systems.

Another primary target is the Libyan air force. It consists of approximately 23,000 personnel divided into a dozen or so close-support and air-defence squadrons equipped with Soviet-manufactured MiG fighter jets and ageing TU 22 bombers.

They are clustered around airfields in Tripoli and Benghazi to the north, with a smaller number of aircraft located to the south at Ghat and Sabhah airfields.

Over the last 24 hours US B-2 stealth bombers have been used in attacks on these airfields to crater their runways and destroy any serviceable aircraft on the ground.

Crucially, in this first wave of attacks the UN-backed coalition will also seek to destroy Gadafy’s ballistic missile assets.

The Libyan military is estimated to possess around 100 Scud-B missiles. These are surface-to-air missiles with a range of around 300km, capable of carrying a 500kg high-explosive warhead.

These Scud B missiles can be fired from highly mobile land or sea-based launchers. In this regard they will pose a serious challenge to the coalition in terms of their pin-point destruction. Gadafy may seek to deploy these missile launchers among the civilian population, thereby creating a de facto “human shield” of innocent Libyan civilians. This was a tactic employed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq during allied no-fly zone operations Northern and Southern Watch in the 1990s.

In addition, the Libyans possess around 40 Soviet-manufactured Frog-7 short-range missiles. These will pose less of a threat to the coalition but might be fired “point blank” at coalition aircraft in the coming days and weeks. Like Scud missiles, they are capable of being transported by road and are capable of being fired from within built-up areas.

In attempting to destroy Gadafy’s missile units over the coming days, the coalition faces the risk of inflicting casualties on innocent civilians – particularly if the Libyan military exploit the mobility of its launchers to deploy them in heavily-populated urban centres.

After the first wave of missile and air strikes, there will be a brief operational pause during which the coalition will conduct a detailed assessment of damage done to Libya’s air and air-defence assets. This will be conducted using surveillance aircraft at high altitude, along with unmanned aerial vehicles or “drones” at low altitudes for close inspection of airfields, radar and missile sites.

Based on this intelligence the coalition will then begin the second phase of its assault on Libya by conducting a comprehensive wave of missile strikes and air strikes to strip Gadafy of his air defences.

The coalition has employed a wide range of Nato assets thus far to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1973.

RAF Tornado jets have flown from bases in the UK, along with US navy Harrier jets on board USS Kearsargeon station in the Mediterranean.

The Canadian air force has deployed F-18 Hornet jets to Sicily with US support, and further squadrons of US air force F-18s are now on standby in bases around the Mediterranean from the US naval air station at Sigonella, Italy, to Moron air force base in Spain. The French are also mounting air operations from Solenzara in Corsica. It is believed that elements of the Qatari air force and that of the UAE will also be deployed.

During operations Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq, the allies enjoyed the support of both the Saudi air force and the Turkish air force. The involvement of Arab partners in the current coalition will be deemed essential for the maintenance of diplomatic and political support for the no-fly zone – particularly as civilian casualties rise.

F-18 Hornet jets, along with B-2 stealth bombers, have been deployed by the coalition in the opening phase of operations against Libya because of their ability to jam hostile radar and missile lock-on mechanisms.

Similarly, cruise missiles have been relied upon during the opening phases to minimise the exposure of coalition pilots and aircraft to Libya’s albeit rudimentary air defences.

The third and most sustained phase of the implementation of the no-fly zone will come into effect later this week. As soon as the coalition has deemed Libya’s air defences neutralised, they will implement a continuous system of combat air patrols over Libya.

These air patrols, carried out by the air forces of several nations operating out of Nato airbases and co-ordinated by Africom, will be authorised under the current UN resolution to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country”.

This will mean they will be able to engage Gadafy’s ground forces – tanks and armoured columns as well as helicopter gunships, artillery or any other Libyan military force – as they approach towns such as Misrati, Benghazi or Tobruk.

This type of intervention may halt Gadafy’s offensives on rebel-held towns. The freedom of individual pilots to engage opportunity targets in this manner, however, will inevitably result in errors and further civilian casualties.

This is an operational hazard familiar to the US in their co-ordination of air operations over Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

The operation and implementation of the current no-fly zone is reasonably predictable in the short term. However, questions will remain as to its duration, the commitment of Arab partners – particularly as civilian casualties mount – and plans for a politically acceptable exit strategy.

Much will depend on Gadafy’s behaviour and tactics in the coming days.

Dr Tom Clonan is the Irish TimesSecurity Analyst