Yet another crisis in former Yugoslavia involving President Slobodan Milosevic, the United States mediator, Mr Richard Holbrooke, thousands of refugees and the threat of NATO air attacks is a brutal reminder that this war is a standing rebuke to Europe's peaceful order. Mr Holbrooke made it clear in Brussels yesterday before flying to meet President Milosevic in Belgrade that air strikes will be mounted if Serbia refuses to accept the Kosovo peace agreement. NATO would lose all credibility if this threat is not delivered on should Mr Milosevic reject these terms. Whether such action would genuinely improve the prospects of reaching a settlement nonetheless remains the great uncertainty of this conflict.
Serbia has rejected the Kosovo accords because they involve the presence of NATO troops on the ground in the territory to implement and police the deal. This is regarded as a breach of Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo. As always, it is extremely difficult to interpret Mr Milosevic's intentions. His priority is first of all to hold on to power; it is not surprising that he should make Kosovo an issue of principle, given that it was here he mobilised Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s so opportunistically as communism collapsed. The Kosovo issue is so sensitive for him that he may be willing to tolerate air strikes before making concessions involving such a loss of face among those who support him.
Mr Milosevic knows very well too how to exploit differences among his adversaries. Despite the determined show of unity among Western members of the Contact Group, several of them are reluctant to endorse air attacks despite the extreme provocation involved. The Russians are against in principle, partly for geopolitical reasons, partly because they would lack legal legitimacy available only from the UN Security Council. More important than that is the uncertainty about what the use of force is intended to achieve. Limiting it to air strikes invites classic objections based on the need for troops on the ground to confront the Serbian army. But that would be to open up the prospect of substantial military casualties among the European troops involved, for which political leaderships believe their electorates are not prepared. The failure to arrest wanted war criminals in NATO-controlled areas of Bosnia for this reason is particularly revealing in this respect.
It is necessary to go back to first principles in judging the Kosovo crisis. The Rambouillet accords offer an honourable compromise on autonomy and protection of civilians for a period of three years. The Serb army has poured in extra troops as if to provoke military retaliation. But there can be no certainty about the military outcome. If force is used without express Security Council sanction, a dangerous precedent is set for other such interventions. All concerned must therefore hope Mr Holbrooke will be able to square these circles with Mr Milosevic, whom he has got to know better than any other Western diplomat in recent years. The omens are not good, and war in that part of the world is a particularly risky venture.