It will, Mr Vladimir Putin has announced, all be over in a few days. This statement from Moscow's newly confirmed prime minister struck a painfully familiar note for ordinary Russians. A notorious defence minister, Gen Pavel Grachev, proclaimed just five years ago that it would take one paratroop division a couple of hours to defeat the forces of the Chechen separatists. Two and a half years later, after at least 20,000 deaths of unarmed civilians, a chastened Russian army left Chechnya in defeat. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the current conflict in Dagestan piles memories of military catastrophe on the already heavy burden of economic hardship borne by Russia's citizens.
Even some of the players are the same as at the time of the Chechen war. The Islamic insurgents who have captured villages in western Dagestan are led by Shamil Basayev, a major figure in the conflict which led to Russia's defeat three years ago. He is reported to have been joined by the bombastic Salman Raduyev, a guerilla commander from the days of the Chechen war. A third military commander, a Jordanian known only as "Khattab", has joined the fray. To make the atmosphere of deja vu complete Russian forces appear to have been less than enthusiastic in pursuing their attacks on the rebels. Some of the Russian soldiers, as in the early days of the Chechen war, appear to be poorly-trained, badly equipped and unwilling conscripts. In a country in which wealthy parents can ensure by bribery that their sons are given safe postings on national service, it can be assumed that the conscripts now in action in Dagestan come from the poorer sections of society.
But there the parallels with the Chechen war end. In Chechnya western and independent Russian journalists were in the war zone to send back reliable reports of military victories and defeats and of the massacre of civilians. Today's reportage is less reliable, for only the foolhardy would venture to Dagestan where Basayev's militants have made a lucrative business out of kidnapping westerners. Neither can it be said that the Chechen or Dagestani people support the rebels. Basayev and his supporters have espoused the beliefs of the Wahabi sect of Islam which emanates from Saudi Arabia and runs counter to the traditional Sufism of the Chechens and the Shi'a allegiances of many Dagestanis.
In the presidential elections of 1997 the supreme Chechen military commander, Gen Aslan Maskhadov, roundly defeated Basayev. Moreover, Salman Raduyev is detested by most people in Dagestan for his attack on the town of Kizlyar in 1996 in which 25 Dagestanis were killed. The Jihad and the new "Government of Dagestan" declared by the rebels lack the indigenous support vital to armed insurgency. The rallying cry which united Chechens in a struggle for national independence is, in this case, missing. The economics of the Islamic fundamentalism expounded by Basayev and his followers have their foundations firmly based in banditry.
But rebel groups have been known in the past to gain support from the populace due to the heavy-handed actions of their opponents. Mr Putin, now confirmed in office by the Duma, has threatened to bomb Dagestani rebel bases in Chechnya. If carried out and if civilians are killed, the political balance could be tipped away from the moderate President Maskhadov in favour of more radical and ruthless forces. Co-ordination of policies between the Russian and Chechen presidents on this issue would seem a wiser course than any macho stance the new prime minister may be tempted to take.