INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE on Hamid Karzai to accept a second round of voting in Afghanistan’s deeply-flawed presidential elections has paid off with his acceptance that political legitimacy necessitates it. The Obama administration could hardly have announced a decision on whether to commit more US troops there without clarity on the country’s political leadership. But the logistical difficulty of organising a fresh round of voting by November 7th with winter fast approaching and new officials required to avoid a repeat of the mass frauds in August’s poll, together with expected efforts by the Taliban to disrupt the election, will make this a perilous effort.
The extent of fraud only emerged gradually, largely because Mr Karzai’s supporters seem to have been mainly responsible for it – a fact he has vehemently denied. Even if he received a clear plurality of votes over his main opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, election monitors were appalled at the huge scale of the fraud in many areas. The government-appointed Independent Electoral Commission rapidly became politicised on how to handle the issue; it has taken the courage of another organisation, the Electoral Complaints Commission, whose international members Mr Karzai could not control, to insist that his majority be reduced fractionally to below 50 per cent, requiring a second round.
Even the dismissal of most election officials, better supervision and technical arrangements will not necessarily improve the democratic validity of this run-off vote. Turnout was seriously low in many southern areas the first time around because of a determined Taliban campaign. If anything, they are militarily stronger now and in a better position to intimidate voters. Winter conditions will deprive mountain regions of a chance to participate. Overall, Afghanistan lacks many of the political and social conditions necessary for democratic elections, even if it was not in the middle of a war.
Too much ideology about nation-building and not enough effort to translate this verbal commitment into practical change on the ground have seriously marred the international involvement. Nato’s military campaign is for these reasons going badly wrong. Such contradictions are readily apparent to ordinary Afghans who despair about political corruption and are drawn to support the Taliban opposition which now controls 70 per cent of the country. This election pitches Mr Karzai, a Pashtun from the south against Mr Abdullah, a Tajik from the north. Afghanistan badly needs a more capable and united, and a less corrupt government. It could get one from a more credible election, possibly through a coalition afterwards between the two men in contention.
But it is hard to see such an outcome arising from the military and political imbroglio there which is increasingly complicated by fighting in Pakistan. Alongside his fateful decision on whether to send more US troops to Afghanistan, Mr Obama needs to give urgent attention to a political solution. It is time to talk directly to Taliban leaders who support the insurrection but have little time for its most fundamentalist objectives.