IF THE Nato operation in Afghanistan is a “war of necessity”, as President Obama said last August, it is shaping up to be a politically momentous one for his administration. The war against the Taliban is going badly and US allies are disinclined to increase their commitment. He now faces an excruciating choice between committing more US troops to a probably unwinnable war or scaling it down by gradually transferring it to Afghan forces, risking a further loss of military momentum against al-Qaeda, the real object of US involvement.
Last week defence secretary Robert Gates called for a more disciplined and private administration debate on these and other options, while acknowledging how significant Mr Obama’s choice will be. His intervention rebuked Nato commander Gen Stanley McChrystal’s public remarks in favour of committing up to 40,000 more US troops to Afghanistan on top of the 68,000 already committed there (and whose numbers have already doubled this year). Asked about the scaled down option supported by Vice-President Joe Biden, Gen McChrystal bluntly rejected it. For his part, Mr Obama is reported to be exploring a middle course.
Gen McChrystal’s public endorsement of such a politically controversial military escalation raises constitutional questions about presidential primacy over the armed forces in the middle of a sharp White House debate. It also illustrates just how fraught the issue has become in US media and public opinion. Inevitably parallels with Vietnam are being drawn, as casualties mount, even though the extent of US involvement is as yet nothing like it was there. But the continuing strategic effect of Mr Obama’s decision could make the two theatres of war far more alike.
The White House consultations with congressional leaders reveal the polarising issues at stake. They overlap with fallout from the flawed first round of Afghanistan’s election, which risks undermining Hamid Karzai’s legitimacy if he is declared the victor. Given the military setbacks, and the deeper question of how precisely the Taliban relates to al-Qaeda, Mr Biden is right to be sceptical about the purely military solution. He prefers a less extensive military campaign, combined with a greater reliance on Afghan and Pakistani forces to confront al-Qaeda. That is also the course favoured by most US allies in Nato. They correctly see this as an unwinnable war in conventional military terms. It badly needs to be de-escalated before the US commitment becomes irreversible.