The strength of Iraqi resistance to the US-British invasion has surprised Westerners and Iraqis alike. The men who have killed or captured US servicemen, shot down at least one Apache helicopter, and so far prevented the foreigners from securing Umm Qasr, Basra, Nasiriyah or any other town of importance bear little resemblance to the famished and demoralised troops who surrendered in the tens of thousands in 1991.
"No one imagined Iraqi forces would do this; least of all us," said an Iraqi journalist. Iraqi officials constantly praise the role of Arab tribesmen and the militia of the Arab Baath Socialist party - forces that were barely factored into the equation before this conflict started.
Several US errors of judgment may explain the setbacks of the past three days. Iraq, too, learned lessons from the 1991 war, paring its army down to almost half its previous size to make it a more efficient fighting force. Unlike 1991, troops are not massed in formation, but deployed in smaller, more mobile units.
In his recent speeches, Saddam Hussein constantly harped on the need to co-ordinate with the Baath party, which regulates most aspects of Iraqi daily life; the party militia, whose olive green uniform is ubiquitous in the capital, is turning out to be a mainstay of the country's defence.
Iraqi nationalism is another factor. In 1991, Iraq was defending its annexation of Kuwait. Today, as they are constantly reminded by their President and high-ranking officials, it is their land that has been invaded.
"They say they're bringing us humanitarian aid," sniffed a British-educated upper middle class Baghdad matron. "How insulting. I don't want aid from them; I want them to leave us alone."
There are frequent allusions to the first insurrection against the British, in 1920. The mood could of course shift, if the pendulum of fear swings in the other direction, but for the time being it is safer to side with the regime.
Washington seemed to think it could find and capture Saddam Hussein in much the same way that it seized the Panamanian ruler, Gen Manuel Noriega, in 1990. But the US has little reliable intelligence from inside Iraq, and despite the long build-up to the war was unable to construct an attractive political alternative to the regime.
In Afghanistan and Kosovo, the last two wars fought by America, the Taliban and Serbs gave up after extended bombing campaigns. US troops moved in after capitulation, but never had to fight on the ground. In Afghanistan and Kosovo, they had the Northern Alliance and the KLA to do the fighting for them; no such proxy force exists in Iraq.
Because of the "zero death" doctrine elaborated by Colin Powell when he was chief-of-staff of the US armed forces, most US servicemen have never had to fight. US forces in Kuwait were pampered with air-conditioned quarters, even in winter, refrigerated drinking fountains, special military shopping centres, video libraries... Iraq is a harsh country where fighting is a badge of virility and honour.
Despite all the bluster, the fact is that neither the US strategy of by-passing Iraqi towns on the way to Baghdad, nor the Iraqi strategy of devoting most assets to the defence of the capital, has really been tested.
With US troops now reported to have reached Kerbala, 50 miles south-west of Baghdad, Saddam Hussein's assertion that "this is the decisive moment" could prove true within days, or even hours.