Rape may warrant life term, court rules

The maximum life sentence may be imposed in rape cases in "rare and exceptional circumstances" even when there is a guilty plea, the Supreme Court has ruled. The fact of a guilty plea does not mean there must be a reduction in sentence, it said yesterday in a major judgment clarifying the law on sentencing in such cases.

Mr Justice Nicholas Kearns was giving the unanimous judgment of the five-judge court dismissing separate appeals by two men against life sentences imposed for "horrific" rape offences against a number of their daughters and, in one man's case, also his nieces, to which they had pleaded guilty.

"It is impossible to conceive of a greater breach of parental responsibility than occurred in these cases," the judge said.

The first man, "A", a former soldier in his 50s, had pleaded guilty to 20 counts of sexual offences over an 11-year period against two of his daughters and four of his nieces. The offences included rape, attempted rape, sexual assault and indecent assault, and were committed when all the victims were young children who were "severely traumatised".

A "tragic aspect" of this man's case was that his offending had come to light in 1987, when he made admissions to gardaí and sought counselling, Mr Justice Kearns said. A file was sent to the DPP but a decision not to prosecute was made. The offences involving the man's nieces occurred in the following years.

The second man, "D", a west of Ireland farmer, pleaded guilty to 10 sample charges of rape and two sample charges of sexual assault against four of his daughters over a 20-year period from 1976 to 1996. All of the offences were committed before the girls reached puberty. There were 153 counts in total on the indictment in that case.

The appeals centred on interpretation of the effect of Section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, which provides that a court, when passing sentence where a person has pleaded guilty, shall, if the court considers appropriate, take into account the stage at which the plea is made and the circumstances in which the indication of the plea is given. Section 29 also provided that a court is not precluded from passing the maximum sentence for an offence if, notwithstanding a guilty plea, it is satisfied there were exceptional circumstances relating to the offence which warranted the maximum sentence.

The Court of Criminal Appeal had held that the offences of both men were of such exceptional gravity that they warranted the maximum penalty. But it asked the Supreme Court to clarify whether Section 29 should be interpreted so as to overrule prior case law to the extent that it is no longer an error in principle for a sentencing court not to make allowance for an early guilty plea.

Mr Justice Kearns said it would always be an error in principle for a judge to fail to take into account mitigating factors when deciding sentence, including guilty pleas. However, it was another matter whether such factors should always, or almost always, result in a reduced sentence. It was undeniable that a reduction of some sort normally attended a guilty plea, he said.

Section 29 did not require courts to depart from normal sentencing procedures. While he did not believe it was ever considered there could not be rare cases where a maximum sentence could be imposed despite a plea, any such doubt was removed by Section 29.

However, where imposing the maximum sentence in a case involving mitigating factors, the court should identify the exceptional circumstances in such a way that would make it clear why the maximum sentence was warranted, the judge said.