Never mind reforming the Seanad - fix the Dáil first

OPINION:There has been another flurry in the debate on the abolition of the Seanad, with many eminent people arguing in favour of its retention, but only as a radically reformed institution.

There is no prominent voice in favour of its retention in its current form. Despite that, I’m not sure we should waste much time on either its abolition or reform.

In articles on this page, Philip Pettit and Michael McDowell both offered an argument for its retention based on the idea of bicameralism and some people there having being exceptionally good.

Bicameralism is the idea that we can, in the words of George Washington, “pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it”. So the Seanad can act as a check on Dáil excesses. But have we seen this happen?

The most obvious Dáil, or more accurately government, excess was the bank guarantee scheme, which exposed Irish taxpayers to billions of euro of private debt. The Seanad passed the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill without amendment, but made much of its staying up all night.

In fact, the data are mixed on non-government amendments being passed in either chamber. The Seanad doesn’t generally seem to notice flaws in legislation at a higher rate than the Dáil.

Michael McDowell points out abolition would be a much more complex procedure than is appreciated. The point he seems to be making is that it would be so much trouble there is no point in trying, and that legislative reform without constitutional change might be easier.

Of course even that legislative reform would be quite difficult. McDowell, for example, proposes giving every citizen the right to register as a voter for one of the vocational panels of the Seanad and to elect candidates nominated in a manner free from the party political process.

Democratic deficit

If we were to create such a chamber, it is argued we’d remove the democratic deficit at the heart of the Seanad. This may be so, but it would create new difficulties. One might note that the current crisis in Italy is as a result of the two chambers not having the same majorities.

Voters frequently like to divide power, and so we could expect “split-ticketing”, where people vote for one party in one chamber and another in the second. A second problem is that we would have nationally elected politicians who would still have very limited powers (remember the reformers suggest no constitutional changes).

So the Seanad could still not block a money Bill, nor could it stop the Government guillotining a Bill. These new politicians might reasonably note the creation of a new democratic deficit and demand they be given more power.

This gets to the heart of the other argument of the anti-abolitionists: the quality of the people in the Seanad. Both McDowell and Pettit point to high-profile people who have been senators. But were TK Whitaker, Gordon Wilson or Séamus Mallon exceptional for what they did in the Seanad, or in the Seanad because of their contributions elsewhere? Even Mary Robinson, who made her name when a senator, made more of a contribution to Irish society in the courts than in the Seanad chamber.

And for every one of these people, hasn’t the Seanad got 10 backwoodsmen? This points to the contradiction at the heart of their solution. The people to whom they point are the least defensible on “democratic” grounds – they are either the Taoiseach’s nominees or hold university seats.

It is less likely the solution of a directly elected chamber would give us the type of people Pettit and McDowell want. The parties could still divvy up the country with regionally based candidates. And would top people really want to run for a still-emasculated second chamber, with a reduced likelihood of ministerial office?

Ministers admit it’s only really possible to run with two or three big policy changes at any one time. Of course if abolition or reform is worth doing, it is worth taking the trouble. But, as McDowell points out, it might not be worth doing.

For all its faults, the Seanad is hardly the problem. It didn’t cause the poor policies that governments from 2002 to 2008 implemented. So if the Government is going to spend its time and resources on any reform, abolition or radical reform of the Seanad is not the place to start.

Fixing the Dáil

We should concentrate effort on fixing the Dáil by empowering it and resourcing it.

As for the Seanad, we need a simple solution that won’t take up much government time or resources, yet might improve the quality of people and the way it operates.

We could pay senators a salary of €10,000 a year, remove their secretarial support and allow a maximum of €10,000 in expenses.

This would make it more likely that those who run for or accept positions in the Seanad will be people whose career is not in politics, but who have achieved something outside politics and would like to contribute to national debates. That might be closer to what the framers of the Constitution intended.

* Dr Eoin O’Malley is a lecturer in Irish politics at the school of law and government in Dublin City University