The most senior British soldier on the ground in January 1972 suggested that ringleaders among street rioters in Derry should be shot, the tribunal was told yesterday.
Gen Sir Robert Ford, who was Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland at the time of Bloody Sunday, had sent a memo outlining a plan "to shoot selected ringleaders" in the Bogside as a means of quelling street unrest.
However, he denied that the idea was to kill anyone, suggesting there was a difference between shooting someone and killing them. He also said the idea would have needed political clearance.
Sir Robert, who was responsible for the army's day-to-day operations in Northern Ireland, maintains he attended the Bloody Sunday march only as an observer and played no part in giving orders.
Tactical decisions on that day were solely the responsibility of Brig Patrick MacLellan, commander of 8th Brigade, who was in charge of all the Paras in Derry, said Sir Robert.
He told the inquiry in London he was not advocating a shoot-to-kill policy because "shoot and kill are obviously different words".
Under questioning by Mr Christopher Clarke QC, counsel for the inquiry, he agreed that rioters could have been killed but added that use of the .22 bullet would have been a less lethal or "marginally lethal" option than using the 7.62 mm army issue bullet.
The aim was to incapacitate a band of rioters dubbed the Derry Young Hooligans who created anarchy by stone-throwing, destruction and arson while hidden under sniper fire, Sir Robert said.
Mr Clarke pointed out that soldiers were trained to "shoot-to-kill". Sir Robert replied that soldiers were taught to shoot this way with a 7.62 mm bullet.
Mr Clarke asked: "If they are taught to shoot-to-kill by firing at a position on the body where the bullet is likely to kill them, the same is highly likely to arise even if they use a .22 bullet."
Sir Robert replied that it was "likely to arise but less likely" than with a 7.62 mm bullet.
Mr Clarke asked: "If you fire a .22 at somebody at a 50-yard range, if you are attempting to kill him and are a well-trained soldier, you are likely to do so, are you not?"
Sir Robert replied: "It depends on the accuracy of the weapon and I do not know anything about that at this stage."
He was aware his suggestion was outside the British army's rules of engagement, but it was not implemented. It was merely a possible idea of how to deal with the hooligan threat, Sir Robert said.
The proposal contained in his memo, to shoot ringleaders if they did not disperse after being given warnings, had been backed by the Northern secretary at the time, Mr Willie Whitelaw, in a British army standoff with the UDA on July 3rd, 1972.
The UDA was up to 7,000- strong in a Catholic area of Belfast and, through sheer weight of numbers, was threatening to "overwhelm" the soldiers protecting the area. Many of them were unarmed, Sir Robert told the inquiry.
He recalled telling Mr Whitelaw: "If the UDA advanced they would overwhelm the soldiers. Probably during that time we would lose a lot of rifles. There would be unarmed conflict, which was unacceptable, and they would achieve their aim."
Sir Robert said he "persuaded" Mr Whitelaw that the only way to stop this was for him to be given authority to confront the UDA leaders with the "disperse or we fire" warning. He contacted the UDA leaders after receiving Mr Whitelaw's approval.
He added: "After some considerable discussion I persuaded them that what I told them was the truth. Eventually they dispersed and the evening was saved."
Specifically shooting ringleaders had not been discussed by the Ministry of Defence or generally at Headquarters Northern Ireland at the time, the inquiry was told.
Sir Robert said he had no idea if his memo or his ideas had reached the Ministry. He told the inquiry that he had forgotten writing the three-page memo about shooting ringleaders, believing that he had passed the information on verbally to the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Sir Harry Tuzo.
In his inquiry statement, Sir Robert said: "It is certainly not the case, if it be suggested, that the march of 30th January was used, or was intended to be used, as an opportunity to put into effect the discussion points I had put to the GOC in my memorandum of 7th January, 1972."
The Paras were not given a licence to kill but had the go-ahead for an aggressive military offensive to stop an illegal march with up to 400 arrests.
The 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment was deployed to arrest rioters, but came under fire from the IRA, he said.
Sir Robert rejected as "ridiculous" claims that Bloody Sunday was his January 7th memo brought to life. His evidence continues today.