The Yugoslav military has prepared itself for the massive air onslaught from NATO planes, although Serbia's generals know what the outcome of the operation will be: they will lose much of their air defences and experience heavy disruption of their supply lines. However, the military and political leadership in Belgrade is playing for longer stakes by assuming that the West's resolve will be broken and that NATO will be unable to translate military action into coherent political aims.
During the past five decades, the Yugoslav military has manufactured an image of invincibility, based on stories of bravery against the Nazi invader in the second World War, and there is no doubt it will put up stiff resistance to NATO air strikes. The British, French and US lost a plane each over the skies of Bosnia earlier this decade, and this was against the Bosnian Serbs, rather than the Yugoslav military as such. The losses in the current air campaign may be heavier.
In fact, the Yugoslav military machine is quite fragile. Years of sanctions, and almost a decade of war in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, have sapped the effectiveness of the Yugoslav forces. High inflation within Yugoslavia, coupled with the loss of weapons factories (most of which were on the territory of now independent Bosnia) have not helped either. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav military holds some important advantages.
The country's generals have always planned for a fight against overwhelming odds; during the Cold War the military feared an invasion from the Soviet Union and, as a result, the country is dotted with bunkers and installations designed to protect military equipment from destruction. The generals are also trained to operate in individual and isolated units, an advantage which may become important if, as predicted, NATO aircraft destroy the Yugoslav military communications system.
Finally, many of the troops in Kosovo have left their barracks and are positioned among the ethnic Albanian villages in the province. Hitting such targets, while avoiding casualties among civilians, will be difficult. So, although the final outcome of a confrontation with the West is not in doubt, the military in Belgrade does have some tricks up its sleeve.
But the most important calculation is political. According to received wisdom, Mr Milosevic is the Yugoslav ruler's behaviour. For, as seen from Belgrade, defying the West and taking a calculated risk on air strikes makes perfect sense. Mr Milosevic realised long ago that he was bound to lose Kosovo. Although the Western peace plan negotiated in France in February, and still the main policy for all European states, calls merely for the creation of an autonomous province, Mr Milosevic knows that once peacekeepers were introduced to the area and free elections held, no Western government would return the territory to his tender mercies.
Mr Milosevic also knows that if he confronts the West, he will also lose Kosovo. So, his choice was between losing the province peacefully or losing it through war. Predictably, he chose to fight in the hope that his determination will not be matched by that of the West and that, at the very worst, he may lose only part of the province.
His strategy in the coming days is also clear. In the first phases of air attacks, he will do nothing. The Yugoslav air force will be kept in reserve and every effort will be made to preserve as many military assets as possible. Mr Milosevic will be hoping that NATO's resolve will be shattered (after all, establishing a consensus within the Alliance on air strikes was never easy) or that Russian pressure will persuade the West to desist. At the same time, a massive ground offensive will be launched against the Albanians, sustained by the estimated 36,000 Yugoslav troops stationed there.
NATO planes will target these forces but, at least in the initial stages of air attacks, the Alliance will be concerned more with eliminating other targets in Yugoslavia itself. Western aircraft are not going to go into action above Kosovo until and unless they are sure to meet no opposition from the Yugoslav air defences. So, there will be a lag of a few days before NATO can target Yugoslavia's troops on the ground. The result will be a stream of refugees from Kosovo. The West is justifying the operation as necessary to avoid a humanitarian disaster. In fact, the biggest humanitarian disaster will unfold when the air attacks begin.
In sustaining his ground offensive in Kosovo, Mr Milosevic will be seeking two objectives. He knows that no Western government wants to send troops into the province - any operation designed to liberate Kosovo probably requires over 100,000 troops and will produce casualties which no country is prepared to contemplate. However, the sight of refugees and repeated massacres will force the West into a straight choice between escalating its involvement or abandoning the air strikes.
Secondly, Mr Milosevic is also preparing for the division of the province. All the latest Yugoslav attacks have been in the northern part of Kosovo, the region which the Serbs wished to hold on to at all costs. Once this area is ethnically "cleansed", Mr Milosevic could stop the attacks and even return to the negotiating table. The air strikes will stop, Kosovo will be divided, and Western forces will be invited to take over the remaining rump of the province, complete with all its refugees.
Mr Milosevic may therefore still survive the confrontation but the cost to his country will be huge. Yugoslavia represents a classic example of what can go wrong in the process of transition from a communist-controlled society. The Yugoslav war, for which Mr Milosevic bears a heavy responsibility, served only to perpetuate a disguised communist rule and postpone serious decisions about the very nature of the Serbian state. He began the war in the name of Serbian unity and ethnic purity.
Yet Serbs are still divided, many have been forcefully removed, and Serbia still contains the highest number of ethnic minorities among the republics of the former Yugoslavia. Having been the most integrated Eastern European state before 1989, rump Yugoslavia is now a pariah country in Europe. To complete this cycle of tragedies, the Yugoslavia which Mr Milosevic invented after 1991 remains a rickety affair. He has failed in his nationalist dreams; he will now witness the destruction of his own state.
Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London.
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