Islamist gunman inquiry identifies security failings

FRANCE’S DOMESTIC spying agency stopped tracking the Islamist gunman Mohamed Merah a few months before his shooting spree in Toulouse earlier this year, an official report has found.

The review for the interior ministry identified “objective failures” in the security services’ handling of the Merah case in the months and years leading up to the killings of seven people in three attacks in March.

It also pointed to shortcomings in how the authorities prepared for the raid that ended when Merah (23) was shot dead by a police sniper.

The report, published yesterday by interior minister Manuel Valls, showed Merah had at least 15 previous convictions and had been monitored by the domestic intelligence agency, DCRI, since 2006. But a series of failures meant the agency was “very late” in establishing that he had embraced radical Islam.

In June 2010 the young man attacked a neighbour who confronted him for showing her son a video depicting decapitation. A lack of co-ordination meant the DCRI was unaware of the incident, which could have helped it establish earlier that Merah had been radicalised in prison in 2008.

Merah, who claimed allegiance to al-Qaeda, shot a rabbi, three Jewish schoolchildren and three French paratroopers in attacks in and around Toulouse in March.

The report by the national police inspectorate said Merah’s DCRI file was “de-activated”, meaning it was not a priority, between March 2010 and January 2011. The agency mistakenly believed there was no reason to maintain it, despite Merah’s details having been found on the contacts list of a member of a Toulouse-based network which sent young men to fight in Iraq.

Officers fully pieced together Merah’s Islamist turn only in early 2011, after he was detained by US soldiers in the Afghan city of Kandahar. Upon his return, Merah was interviewed by intelligence officers, but the report said insufficient preparation for this session meant the officers were unable to confront Merah with “the contradictions” in his account of the trip. They later learned he had jihadist training in the region.

In August last year, Merah travelled to Pakistan, but this went unnoticed at the time because he transited through Oman, which was not one of the 31 destinations where outbound travel is monitored by French intelligence.

The monitoring of Merah was scaled back late last year, and by January 2012 he was no longer under surveillance.

On the 32-hour stand-off that ended with Merah’s death, the report stopped short of criticising the elite armed unit in charge, but queried how the suspect was able to come and go unnoticed from his apartment in the hours before the police operation. That forced the commando unit to delay its raid. When it began, Merah surprised officers by opening fire immediately, forcing the police to retreat and open negotiations.

Separate intelligence documents obtained by the newspaper Le Monde showed that in April last year Merah was described as showing “paranoid behaviour” and was said to have composed songs “glorifying the extermination of ‘western infidels’.” Agents also noted that he had no personal internet connection or telephone.

The ministry’s report made recommendations for tighter surveillance and better co-ordination between the various security agencies. Mr Valls said all necessary changes would be made.