History and geography rhyme for new Germany

In the heart of the new Berlin, on the Potsdamer Platz, there can be found the Infobox, an architectural guide to one of the greatest building sites in the world. A rectangular two-storey building painted red and erected on metal stilts, it was intended by the main developers to explain what has been planned for the city soon to become Germany's capital again, with the aid of scale models, drawings, graphics and films.

It has proved a spectacular success, being the only guide of its kind. Berliners and visitors flock to it day by day in their thousands. They are still coming to terms with the vast building boom in their city, which has disrupted traffic, spread dust and generated many jobs. Some of the buildings have been completed, but most are still under construction.

What it shows is also spectacular. There are two major sites. On either side of the Potsdamer Platz two large international companies, Mercedes and Sony, are acting as consortia for a private rebuilding programme containing offices, housing and institutional headquarters. Some of the most exciting contemporary architecture will soon be found here.

To the north, across the Unter den Linden and adjacent to the Brandenburg Gate, another huge complex of buildings is arising, new and restored, which will house the federal chancellery, government headquarters and departments of state. The Reichstag is being completely rebuilt internally, with a new dome.

Tunnels will connect these complexes, the first buildings of which are now finished. It will be a race to have them ready by 1999, when the main government functions transfer from Bonn.

Berlin is thus resuming its historical role as the capital of a united Germany. At a seminar in Berlin City Hall two weeks ago a gathering of journalists from EU member-states discussed the theme "Quo Vadis Europe? - Is 1997 a key year for European integration?" with senior German officials. The handsome redbricked building dates back 100 years and overlooks the most ancient of Berlin's public squares.

Dr Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office, posed the rhetorical question: "Why does Germany need Europe after unity?" In answering it he reminded us of an appropriate German maxim: "Politics is the daughter of history and history is the daughter of geography."

German unity does not mean the end of its geography, just as the passing of the Cold War has not brought history to an end. One is made aware of this by Berlin's proximity to central and eastern Europe, by the continued cultural division between the east and west of the city and by the spanking new central train station under construction - the confluence of 10 of Europe's main railway thoroughfares.

On the way from the new central part of the city to its western zone one passes the monument marking the Soviet capture of Berlin two months ahead of the other allied forces in 1945. I was reminded of the remark by a Soviet diplomat during the celebrated walk in the Geneva woods in 1987 as strategic nuclear weapons were being negotiated, that "history is only geography stretched over time".

German policy-makers are acutely aware of these geopolitical realities. Dr von Ploetz said "we need Europe to promote and preserve our vital interests. Any alternative can be nothing but worse". He outlined the four objectives pursued by German negotiators at the Inter-Governmental Conference that concluded in Amsterdam: a more workable and common EU foreign and security policy; justice and home security to protect Europe from unwanted immigration and trans-border crime; institutional preparation for enlargement; and strengthened subsidiarity to make the EU more acceptable to its citizens.

Germany was relatively satisfied that most of these goals had been achieved, he said. The conspicuous exception, institutional preparation for EU enlargement (on which decisions were postponed in Amsterdam), he believes will be tackled only when political leaders are faced with the necessity to agree in perhaps five years' time.

"For the first time in its existence Germany is surrounded by allies, not enemies, who don't see us as a threat any more", Dr von Ploetz insists. This is a major factor in creating what he describes as an "irreversible peace order" in Europe.

This could not be achieved by Germany acting on its own, without the help of its present and aspirant EU partners. He quotes with approval the historian Fritz Stern, who has argued in a recent essay that Germany is facing its second great chance this century to find a peace order that "corresponds to the interests of our neighbours". The first chance was lost with the first World War.

Dr von Ploetz has only one reservation about this formulation - its title, which refers to "lost magnitude". This is interesting when considered in the light of a recent study of German foreign policy in Europe by three British academics, Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William Patersen. They refer to Germany's ability to "shape its regional milieu" as the source of its power and influence in Eurpoe. One does not lose magnitude if one can achieve one's goals in this way.

It was interesting, too, that Dr von Ploetz chose to begin his talk with a discussion of the relationship between European nationstates and the EU in the light of that between the federal government and the 16 lander in Germany. The lander have in fact many more staff in Brussels than the federal government itself. They drive the German debate on subsidiarity and "competence federalism" both nationally and in the EU.

The prime example of such milieu-shaping is the design of the EMU project, seen by the German political class as essential to embed Germany in Europe. But there is a paradox here, as Mr Wolfgang Gibowski of the press and information office in Bonn pointed out. Whereas from outside Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of EMU, in Germany less than half say that. The main fear is that the single currency will not be stable.

But at the same time EMU comes far down the list of political issues considered by Germans as important. Of those opposed to the single currency only half consider the subject of some political importance. Mr Gibowski concludes that it is regarded predominantly as a technical subject, a means to an end which "does not touch on central aspects of constitutional patriotism". He therefore expects it to be accepted by the German public, even if it is a broad currency. Other speakers agreed.

As the full consequences of German unity become more manifest it is clear, therefore, that this is a satisfied power, or at least a nearly-satisfied one. When economic and monetary union and EU enlargement are in place the milieu-shaping project will be complete. It is not a threatening prospect, in my opinion, in the light of the diplomatic Infobox of this seminar, but rather a triumph of common European politics and geography over German history.