It was a good Friday. Irish voters decided and the decision showed that, contrary to a belief that had become ingrained over the past three decades or even over the past century, conflicts about sovereignty need not be zero-sum.
The day was wonderful, but it was not without blemish. One alleged blemish is, however, quite spurious, namely the contention that a majority of unionists voted against the agreement. The RTE Prime Time/Lansdowne exit poll gives an invaluable insight into how all sorts of groups voted. It shows the following range of support for the agreement among groups that might be regarded as relevant to this issue: 55 per cent among those who described themselves as unionists; 52 per cent among supporters of parties that support the Union; 51 per cent among Protestants and 48 per cent among those who either describe themselves as unionists or as loyalists. There is simply no basis in these figures for claiming that there is a "unionist majority against the agreement" and especially not for extrapolating this putative majority to the forthcoming Assembly elections. Other evidence in the exit poll is much more relevant to the forthcoming election and much more positive for supporters of the agreement. For one thing, not all those who voted No are resolutely opposed to all aspects of the agreement, especially not to the constitutional aspects. More importantly, a clear majority of them (69 per cent) agree with the proposition that, "if the agreement is passed, those elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly should try to make it work". Almost one-third of No voters strongly agree with this statement.
Thus, even if one could demonstrate that "a majority of unionists" voted against the agreement, there is plenty of evidence to show that No voters will not necessarily follow through and vote for candidates who are determined to undermine the Assembly and the agreement, particularly not if they receive adequate assurances on security in the meantime.
For it is quite clear that worries about security rather than about sovereignty constituted the major source of opposition to the agreement in Northern Ireland. This demand for an end to violence in fact reinforces the message that comes through in the Yes vote. When asked in the exit poll why they had voted as they did, overwhelming majorities of Yes voters on both sides of the Border explicitly said, in one form or another: peace. One might argue that the demand for peace was always there. The difference this time was that the political process had responded by producing a complex constitutional compromise and a delicate piece of constitutional machinery on which the hope of the peoples of this island now rest. So what were the blemishes? Well, they pertain to the vote in this Republic. A 94 per cent Yes vote was wonderful and must enter the annals of electoral history as an extraordinary endorsement of what was, after all, a far-reaching constitutional change. But, let's be honest, a 56 per cent turnout was a pretty poor show. It is true the British-Irish Agreement issue was highly consensual and the outcome was predictable. Such factors tend to reduce turnout. But one would have thought that civic duty, or wanting to do one's bit to help find a solution in Northern Ireland, or simply being mobilised by one's party or political leaders would have produced a much higher level of participation. And then there was also the Amsterdam issue. In fact, Amsterdam should have brought out a much more substantial vote as an issue in itself. It will certainly do so in Denmark next Thursday. In the case of Ireland, there is little doubt but that, were it not for the concurrence of the two referendums, the percentage turnout for Amsterdam would have been in the mid 40s , as it was for the Single European Act referendum in 1987 and as it is in European Parliament elections that are not accompanied by either local or national elections.
There is also a problem with the Amsterdam outcome itself. The problem does not lie with the fact that opposition to EU Treaty changes has substantially increased. The problem is that, as indicated by the RTE Prime Time/ Lansdowne exit poll, one-third of those who voted against did so because they did not know enough about it. One cannot foist on the Referendum Commission all the blame for the low turnout in the referendums or for the fact that people were voting No on Amsterdam because they did not know enough about it. The fact is that information is not understanding, acting is not debating and advertising is not mobilising. The latter in each case is a function of politicians and of the political process. If confidence in both is not to be further eroded, the referendum process as it now stands will need to be re-examined.
Richard Sinnott is director of CEEPA (Centre for European Economic and Public Affairs) at UCD and author of Irish Voters Decide: Voting Behaviour in Elections and Referendums since 1918 (Manchester University Press, 1995).