The picture emerging at the rail signalling inquiry is of a rapid rise in costs on an Iarnr≤d ╔ireann project while crucial information passed very slowly within the company and its parent, CI╔.
Now in its third week of public hearings, a subcommittee of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport uncovered new evidence yesterday of reports of a £36 million overshoot being delivered to management figures within Iarnr≤d ╔ireann and CI╔, but not to their boards.
Although this suggests the flow of information was as unreliable as some of CI╔'s rail and bus services, the subcommittee has yet to focus on its links with Esat group. The construction of a telecoms network on the railway created a lucrative asset for Esat - at the same time as the signalling plan ran aground - but it breached CI╔'s procurement policy. The subcommittee has only skirted the issue, while certain witnesses have been called back to answer questions already put to them in earlier sessions.
Yesterday the focus was again on CI╔'s internal handling of a project that should have been completed for £14 million by December 31st, 1999. Costs have risen to more than £50 million and the Mini-CTC system remains incomplete, even though CI╔ wanted to construct the signalling and Esat systems simultaneously.
The principal witness yesterday was CI╔'s former chairman, Mr Brian Joyce. He held the post from late 1995 until March 6th, 2000, when he resigned, citing "fundamentally differing views" with the Minister for Public Enterprise, Ms O'Rourke, over the group's autonomy.
Mr Joyce said yesterday that his departure was not linked to the over-run, which first came to his attention at the end of October 1999. He said it took CI╔'s then group executive, the late Mr Michael McDonnell, one day to find out that the system's projected cost had then reached £40 million. This arose, he claimed, because many within Iarnr≤d ╔ireann were "running for cover" over the spiralling costs.
"I wasn't exactly best pleased," said Mr Joyce. He advised Mr McDonnell to contact the Department of Public Enterprise, but decided not to meet Ms O'Rourke because he was reluctant to present a problem with no solution to suggest.
CI╔'s auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), had been engaged that month to produce a report on the suspected over-run, but that study, completed within weeks, was not put to the CI╔ board. According to CI╔'s finance director, Mr Jim Cullen, this arose because the report did not add anything to what was already known about the escalating costs.
This was the first of a number of reports, which were either never presented to directors or were slow to be delivered.
One internal report was awaited by CI╔'s board members at their monthly meetings from November 1999 but only presented in June 2000. The minutes from the meeting said the directors "expressed disappointment" with its contents. One SIPTU worker director, Mr Bill McCamley, told the inquiry that he was "very very concerned" at the sequence of events outlined. He believed there had been an attempt to "bury" some of the issues and that no one was taking responsibility for their actions.
In addition, he said he had been subjected to "psychological intimidation" when he questioned what was emerging. The departure of Iarnr≤d ╔ireann staff to one of its contractors, Modern Networks Ltd, was "suspicious", he said. Counsel for three of those figures, Mr Eoin McCullough, said this suggestion was without foundation.
There were other reports. Iarnr≤d ╔ireann's company secretary, Mr Richard O'Farrell, said he prepared a lengthy document on the affair. However, he was advised by Mr McDonnell not to present it to the company's board.
A separate study was commissioned from PwC in January 2000, but its report of March 28th that year was considered a draft only and not circulated beyond Mr McDonnell, Mr Cullen and the CI╔'s solicitor, Mr Michael Carroll. A summary of that draft completed in July was put to the September board meeting.
That was the study that prompted the inquiry's establishment.