In a decision with implications for the work of the Criminal Assets Bureau, the Supreme Court has found that the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, under which CAB operates, does not apply to the proceeds of crime committed outside the State.
In light of that, the five-judge court yesterday overturned a High Court order, granted to CAB, prohibiting a man, who is a UK citizen in his 60s, from dealing with or selling a house in Co Wicklow. The High Court order was on the basis that the premises represented in whole or in part the proceeds of crime.
The man against whom the order was made cannot be named for legal reasons, but was described by Mr Justice Fennelly as having a long record of the commission of serious crime in the UK, including firearms and drugs crime. He has no criminal record here.
The house in question was bought by the man in the late 1980s, without taking out a mortgage, for £128,000. In 1993, it was transferred to the man's partner for £5. Later, she executed an acknowledgment that she held it in trust for the man, and executed a transfer of the house, dated 2000, in his favour for £10.
When the matter was before the High Court, the court heard the house was occupied by the man's current partner.
In evidence to the High Court, CAB said it became aware of the man in 1999 as a result of an anonymous letter, and made contact with the English police. CAB received information, which it was satisfied was accurate, that the man was arrested in 1992 in possession of Stg £300,000 worth of drugs, firearms and some Stg £12,000 cash. He was also convicted of interfering with a jury who were trying a case involving an organised criminal group. CAB told the High Court the man was considered to be a career criminal involved in distribution of drugs in the UK.
CAB said the Wicklow house was bought with two bank drafts which the man had bought for cash. A CAB officer said it believed the house to constitute the proceeds of crime.
The man had told the High Court that, in periods when he was freed from prison, he earned money from a men's clothing business and from buying, selling and racing greyhounds.
However, the president of the High Court, Mr Justice Finnegan, said the man had not satisfied him that the house was not acquired, at least in part, by the proceeds of crime and, in July 2002, made a freezing order regarding the house.
The man appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. Among his grounds of appeal was that the Act does not apply to the proceeds of crime committed outside the State.
Granting the appeal, Mr Justice Fennelly said the 1996 Act clearly has effect only within the boundaries of this State. It was clear the purpose of the legislation was to freeze, and ultimately confiscate, property acquired with or representing the proceeds of crime committed in this State. The Act contained no indication of any broader objective and, in his view, does not apply to the proceeds of foreign crime. He would allow the appeal on the ground that the Act never applied to these premises.
In a dissenting view from the other four Supreme Court judges, Mr Justice Fennelly upheld complaints by the man about how the High Court had evaluated evidence given by a CAB authorised officer to the court.
The man had complained about the weight attached by the court to admissible hearsay evidence received and to a statement by the High Court judge that he was satisfied, on evidence given by two English police officers, there were reasonable grounds for the CAB officer's belief the property was acquired with the proceeds of crime.
In his judgment, Mr Justice McCracken agreed the 1996 Act does not apply to the proceeds of crime committed outside this State.
However, while there was a certain ambiguity in the High Court decision regarding evaluation of evidence, he was not convinced the High Court was in error and believed that court's ultimate findings as to the evidence should stand.