Bruton believes SF has required assurances

THE Taoiseach, Mr Bruton returned to Ireland early this morning believing Sinn Fein had been given four sets of assurances it had indicated might be necessary to persuade the IRA to reinstate its ceasefire.

One worry Sinn Fein had been expressing, he said, "presumably on behalf of the ones with whom they have contacts", was that the forthcoming all party talks would be just about decommissioning. First, the joint communique issued by the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on February 28th made it clear that that would not be the case. Second, the latest consultation paper had reaffirmed that. Third, Mr Bruton had stressed that point in the US last week and, fourth, he had asked the American administration, in his consultations with President Clinton, to take "a particular interest in this point".

In a major interview on the current phase of the peace process at the conclusion of his St Patrick's Day visit to the United States and Newfoundland, Mr Bruton signalled the consultation paper on the ground rules for substantive all party negotiations would not be changed. He expected to be talking to the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major this week about the proposals for an elective process in Northern Ireland. He also stated that he did not envisage "a preordained pace" for the decommissioning of arms after the start of negotiations on June 10th.

Explaining the basis for the publication of the consultation paper at this stage, Mr Bruton said it was fairly clear in the negotiations which led up to the joint communique on February 28th that there would be consultation on the basis of papers circulated to the parties to avoid misunderstandings.

The joint communique, he indicated, spelt out that the proximity talks were about reaching agreement on two things: a broadly acceptable elective process, and the structure, format and basis of the all party talks. They were also to consider whether there would be an ad vantage in having referendums, North and South.

The consultation paper, sent to all parties on Saturday, dealt with what would happen after June 10th. The two governments, in order to reach agreement, had produced this paper.

Asked to define the status of the paper, Mr Bruton said: "This is a consultation paper prepared by the two governments, who have listened very carefully to all of the parties who have put forward practical proposals for the management of the talks. Obviously, other views will be expressed, but this consensus between the governments is a solid and practical way forward".

It was a document explaining the mechanics, rather than the political objectives, of the talks after June 10th.

The important point to stress about these talks, he added, was that, unlike the 1992 talks, the strands were not being taken in sequence. There was no question of dealing with Strand One first, and then getting so far with that before moving on to Strand Two. Strands One, Two and Three were all more or less starting at the same time. Because of that, and because of the interaction between the three strands, there was a need for a joint management process involving the two governments.

Responding to unionists concerns that the paper implied that the Government could have an input into Strand One - dealing with the internal affairs of Northern Ireland - Mr Bruton said that was not the intention.

"The intention is to recognise the reality that the three strands are going to be running in parallel and that the Irish Government has an intimate interest in two of the three strands, and that there will be an interaction, or a crossover, between Strand One and Strand Two. In so far as the Irish Government has a responsibility for Strand Two and Strand Three, it will have to take into account, in the exercise of its responsibility, what is happening in Strand One", he continued.

He summarised that it was with a view to managing the consequences of what was happening in Strand One for Strands Two and Three that the Government was involved.

He regarded it as "very important" that the paper gave an assurance that no single item, including decommissioning, would be allowed to inhibit the progress of the talks. He had raised that matter with President Clinton, as well as during his various speeches in the US. "I stressed that there was no question of one issue becoming a log jamming issue for other issues", he added.

Strictly speaking, this was not new, he continued, since the final paragraph of the joint communique clearly stated that the Mitchell principles must be addressed at the outset of the talks; that included decommissioning. But immediately after that, there was another sentence which referred to confidence having to be created so that there would be a serious negotiation on all the other issues.

"One of the concerns that Sinn Fein have been expressing, presumably on behalf of the ones with whom they have contacts, is that the talks would just be about decommissioning that that would be the only issue", he continued.

It was clear, on the face of the communique negotiated between Mr Major and himself, that this was not going to be the case. The consultation paper reaffirmed that. He had stressed this point publicly. He had also asked the American administration, in his consultations with President Clinton, to take a particular interest in this point.

"All of these four initiatives . . . are designed to give the sort of reassurance that Sinn Fein have indicated might be necessary to persuade the IRA to reinstate their ceasefire," Mr Bruton stated.

He was then asked what he envisaged Sinn Fein and the IRA would have to do after June 10th, in so far as the Mitchell principles and decommissioning were on the immediate agenda. Did they simply have to agree to the Mitchell principles at an early stage and then address decommissioning and agree to deal with decommissioning in some way over a long period of time?

Mr Bruton replied that this was very much going to depend on the way the talks advanced. "If there is a willingness to make a lot of progress on a lot of other issues that might be beneficial to Sinn Fein's electorate in terms of their objective of parity of esteem, obviously there would be an expectation that the decommissioning issue would be dealt with at the same pace.

"If the pace of the negotiations is slower, there would be, perhaps, a slower requirement to deal with the range of issues. So it is going to depend very much on the speed of the negotiations as a whole, rather than on one issue where you have to have a preordained pace regardless of what is happening on the other issues", the Taoiseach stated.

Asked about the nature of consultation between the British and Irish governments before the British reach a decision on the election model for the North, Mr Bruton said consultation was "ongoing". The Tanaiste had met the Northern Secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, a few days ago. It was a very strong possibility that he would be talking by telephone to Mr Major about it in coming days. That was provided for, if necessary.

Asked if there was a danger now that the Ulster Unionist Party, backed by the Alliance Party, could have a majority in the consultations about the election model, Mr Bruton said there was also some evidence that the SDLP and the Democratic Unionist Party would have a similar view around some type of single constituency approach.

It was not clear which of the two approaches, or what combination, had the widespread support suggested in the Mitchell report and accepted by both governments. That was a matter on which work was ongoing with a view to establishing a basis for going forward.

It was not an easy issue because there were quite divided opinions. There was also argument between the parties on whether any elective process would be to exclusively elect negotiators or whether there might be some other functions that might be performed. That was another issue on which decisions were going to have to be taken soon.

The Government favoured a list system in a constituency wide election. It also favoured the approach of having the minimum complication. The election should be to elect people to start negotiations rather than to get involved in other tasks.

Turning to the value of his US Visit, Mr Bruton said the things had been achieved. First of all, he felt that he had very publicly enlisted President Clinton's support for giving the necessary reassurance that talks would not be log jammed on one issue. And he hoped that that clear statement - which he was successful in getting the President to make - would reassure Sinn Fein sufficiently to get it to get the IRA to call of its.

Secondly, he had taken the opportunity to raise the prisoners issues, and the Patrick Kelly case in particular, with Mr Clinton.

Thirdly, he was very anxious also to speak directly to Irish America about the futility of violence and about the fact that there were two traditions with two sets of allegiances in Northern Ireland. It was important that he would do that, not just to get Irish America to understand that violence was wrong, but to be seen to do that by the unionist delegation present. It could see that the Government was not saying something different in America to what it was saying at home.

He said it was important that an Irish Taoiseach had been asked to address a joint session of the Republican dominated Congress later this year.

Turning to the mood of Irish America, Mr Bruton said that a lot of people who prior to the ceasefire might have had a sneaking degree of support for the IRA's campaign were absolutely determined now that the ceasefire had to be restored. "That message coming back to Ireland from Irish America will be very strong and very helpful".