The meeting of foreign ministers from the Group of Seven most industrialised countries and Russia, held yesterday in Bonn, achieved its main purpose - superficially. The Russian and Western governments, at loggerheads since the Yugoslav war began, have finally agreed on a common approach, to serve as the basis for any peace deal in the Balkans. But the painfully crafted agreement is full of loopholes, bearing the clear hallmarks of a diplomatic compromise whose real purpose was to achieve a truce between Moscow and the West, rather than impose a Balkans peace.
For different reasons, both the West and Russia needed a new accommodation. NATO is stuck with an air offensive which can create a great deal of destruction in Yugoslavia, but cannot be translated into a political settlement. The option to use ground forces has not been ruled out completely, but it is now less likely than ever, essentially because President Clinton does not believe he has either the required public support or the necessary Congressional backing. Exploring peace opportunities allows NATO to maintain its internal cohesiveness in what is increasingly becoming a war of attrition.
The Russians have an equal interest in getting closer to the West. They cannot prevent NATO from continuing the air strikes, but do not wish to see Yugoslavia utterly destroyed. The Kremlin also wishes to be locked into any peace agreement which may evolve, while exploiting the fact that it is now the only interlocutor acceptable to both NATO and the Yugoslav regime. The Bonn meeting of foreign ministers yesterday merely made public a rapprochement which has been going on for at least a week. Nevertheless, it represents just the beginning of a long period of diplomatic haggling.
On the positive side, the foreign ministers agreed that all the refugees and displaced people of Kosovo must be allowed to return home, and that the Yugoslav troops will have to withdraw from the province. They also agreed that an international force should be introduced into Kosovo, both to ensure compliance with the provisions of any peace deal, and to provide protection for the Albanians. But the differences between Russia and the West remain much more significant.
The first obstacle is over the final status of Kosovo. At the peace conference in France earlier this year, Yugoslavia was told to grant the province autonomy, in return for a guarantee that Kosovo would remain its sovereign territory. President Slobodan Milosevic rejected this deal, and the Russians now wish to resurrect it.
The snag is that events have moved on; even if Mr Milosevic was to accept autonomy for Kosovo today, no ethnic Albanian would settle for less than complete independence, given the bloodshed of the last couple of months. The West and the Russians have merely agreed to disagree on this point; yesterday's Bonn communique mentions both the notion of autonomy for the Albanians and the principle of Yugoslavia's "territorial integrity".
The German government has privately suggested a way around this difficulty. Kosovo would theoretically remain part of Yugoslavia, but its autonomy arrangements will be imposed by a UN Security Council resolution. The implication is that, at least in legal terms, the province will enjoy an international status quite separate from any other Yugoslav territory. It is an ingenious proposal, but there is no evidence that the Russians accepted it. Indeed, in many respects the Russians have upped their demands, through the inclusion of a provision for the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The idea that the Albanians would return to a territory still controlled by Yugoslavia while being deprived of their own guerrilla movement is a non-starter.
A much bigger tussle continues over the composition of the international force scheduled to be introduced into the province. On this score, the West made a number of concessions behind the scenes. NATO originally demanded that only its troops should be stationed in Kosovo. It then relented and promised to accept soldiers from non-NATO countries.
As Western governments know from their previous experience in Bosnia and Croatia, there is a huge difference between a force designed merely to police a deal, and one created to enforce an agreement. The Russians evidently hope for the former; the West is aiming for the latter. But the Delphic pronouncement from Bonn yesterday suggests a force somewhere in between.
It is possible to argue that, given the strident and often diametrically opposed positions adopted by the West and Russia in this conflict, yesterday's agreement was no mean achievement. At the very least, it will have the effect of cornering Mr Milosevic, while engaging the UN in the search for a peaceful solution.
The problem for the West, however, is that Moscow is not speaking with one voice. The special Russian negotiator in this crisis is Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former prime minister unceremoniously dumped by President Yeltsin last year. As a potential candidate in Russia's forthcoming presidential elections, Mr Chernomyrdin is eager to score a diplomatic triumph in the Balkans, and has therefore proven to be much more conciliatory towards the West.
Mr Igor Ivanov, Russia's Foreign Minister, has taken a completely different tack: within minutes after the agreement was concluded yesterday in Bonn, Mr Ivanov repeated Moscow's original stance, according to which NATO troops could enter Kosovo only if the Yugoslav authorities consented, a position deemed unacceptable in every European capital.
The diplomatic battle in the Balkans is therefore conducted now at three levels: between NATO and Yugoslavia, between the West and Russia and within the Russian establishment itself.
The prospects for peace have moved forward yesterday. Yet they continue to move at snail's pace.
Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London