Milosevic's indictment for war crimes hampers search for peaceful solution

The indictment of President Slobodan Milosevic by the UN International Tribunal may satisfy those who believe the Balkans war should be about principles, but it will severely complicate the search for a peaceful end to the conflict.

Although Western governments have periodically threatened various Balkan leaders with criminal responsibility (and have reiterated this threat in more specific terms at the start of the Kosovo war), they have been careful not to single out President Milosevic for punishment. The reasons for this reticence are both political and military.

From the start of the air offensive this March, NATO leaders knew that they may still have to deal with Mr Milosevic. Indeed, NATO's official position is that if the Yugoslav President withdraws from Kosovo and allows the introduction of an international force, he can continue ruling his country.

The military was also doubtful about fingering Mr Milosevic as the ultimate culprit. Once this is done, the entire nature of the Kosovo operation changes from one which is essentially humanitarian (the reversal of ethnic cleansing and the return of refugees) to a moral crusade which, if taken to its logical conclusion, could entail the occupation of Yugoslav territory and the imposition of a new regime in Belgrade, hardly aims which the Alliance's commanders wish to pursue.

Yet NATO has no control over the international tribunal in The Hague; having played with the tribunal at various times in the recent past - sometimes by supplying its prosecutors with intelligence information about massacres inside Yugoslavia but then doing nothing when the court issued arrest warrants - Western governments are now discovering that the tribunal has acquired its own independent existence. NATO may not like the timing of the indictment, but it will have to live with it: one cannot claim to uphold international law but still hope to bend it in order to suit temporary military objectives.

In theory, the Alliance can continue with its current policies. Since the war began, NATO never tried to deal with Mr Milosevic directly, partly because he was already beyond the pale with Western public opinion, and partly because no Western leader could risk the humiliation attached to meeting him unless there was the guarantee of a full diplomatic success, something which Belgrade never provided.

In order to avoid these dangers, NATO has relied on the services of Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former Russian prime minister and now Moscow's roving Balkan ambassador, as well as enlisting the mediation efforts of the Finnish President. These two negotiators can still put together a peace deal which the UN Security Council would be asked to approve and which, in turn, can be implemented regardless of Mr Milosevic's personal fate.

In order to improve the chances of such a deal, NATO has let Belgrade know, albeit informally, that it is prepared to contemplate some concessions. Originally, the Alliance demanded the total withdrawal of Yugoslav troops. This demand still stands, but the Alliance was beginning to contemplate in the last few weeks the possibility that some Yugoslav "representatives" could remain in Kosovo.

NATO ALSO started the war by demanding the right to introduce a peacekeeping force into the province. This has been watered down to a demand for an international force, in which NATO will merely have a "substantial contribution". Finally, although NATO vowed to continue the air strikes until its demands have been met in full, Mr Milosevic has a guarantee that, once "substantial" numbers of Yugoslav troops are preparing for a pullout from Kosovo, the bombardment will stop and withdrawing forces will not be targeted.

Mr Milosevic is not exactly in a good position. The sporadic defections of soldiers, coupled with antiwar demonstrations in various Yugoslav towns (and especially in Kursevac, which was a Milosevic stronghold), indicate there is a limit to how much pain the population is prepared to suffer. Most of his country's economic infrastructure is destroyed and, with good weather at the moment, NATO's air offensive is intensifying by the hour.

Finally, the Alliance's decision to increase its ground forces in the region to 50,000 troops gives Mr Milosevic a clear deadline: a month from now he will face the real threat of a ground offensive, if NATO leaders decide that this is a feasible course. These calculations, coupled with the concessions hinted at by the Alliance, could have resulted in a deal. But the indictment by the international tribunal may overturn this calculation.

Quite apart from the fact that Mr Milosevic's personal survival is now at stake and that the Yugoslav leader has little incentive to engage in further dialogue, there are other considerations which will loom large in Belgrade. The Yugoslav authorities hoped that, if they accepted a peace deal, they would be able to benefit from some of the reconstruction aid which is now offered to the region.

Mr Milosevic is not particularly interested in the cash as such (probably because he knows this will not be generous for his country) but more in the principle: if he had to give up Kosovo, he could have at least argued that he ended his country's international isolation. Aware of these designs, NATO considered the offer of aid after a deal is signed as one of the Alliance's most important diplomatic cards.

No longer, for it is difficult to see how discussion on aid can even be started as long as Mr Milosevic remains in power. Furthermore, the fact that the international warrant against Mr Milosevic also extends to four of his closest aides has deeper implications inside Yugoslavia: it means Mr Milosevic is less isolated. (The commanders of the Yugoslav troops in Kosovo are already on the international tribunal's wanted list.) The immediate effect of the indictment may therefore be to close the ranks of the Yugoslav leadership even further.

Finally, the West will find it hard to follow through with the compromises which NATO privately suggested to the Yugoslav authorities. It is difficult to argue that any peace deal can be concluded with an indicted war criminal, and even harder to appear to be making compromises with him.

The peace negotiations are going to continue, partly because the West has an interest in keeping the Russians involved, and partly because the continuation of these negotiations is NATO's way of maintaining internal cohesion within the Alliance itself. But every detail of these negotiations will be scrutinised by public opinion.

The biggest obstacle to a peace deal until now has been NATO's determination to appear as the only real winner in the Balkans war, and Mr Milosevic's determination not to be portrayed as the chief loser. The prosecutors in The Hague have now made sure that the threshold has been raised much higher.

The confrontation is now a fight to the finish between NATO and Mr Milosevic.

Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London.