Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland: From indifference to pragmatism

Margaret Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland was “a powerful blend of reactionary politics and personal indifference” and was a notable policy failure of her political career, according to Stephen Kelly. To her, it was “an annoying distraction”. Indifference was embittered by the killing of close political allies, so that security remained her central policy, but this didn’t stop her from adapting and modifying her approach, especially in her evolving attitude to the Irish government.

When she became Conservative leader in 1975, she knew little about Northern Ireland and was security obsessed. During her first period as prime minister, she resented how much of her time was consumed by Northern Irish events and tended to appoint secretaries of state there who knew little about it. But her attitude changed in her second term, and her signing of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement “was arguably one of her finest diplomatic achievements”. Kelly credits Geoffrey Howe with influencing her in this direction, as well as Robert Armstrong and a small group of civil servants; he describes the agreement as “one of the most significant shifts in British policy towards Northern Ireland since the enactment of partition”.

Thatcher, an “English” unionist (or nationalist), often disliked Ulster unionist politicians

During her final term, the North was never far from her thinking and although unhappy with the Irish government regarding cross-Border security, she prepared the ground for an initiative that led eventually to the 1998 Belfast Agreement – the reactivation of a secret line of communication with the IRA that led to Peter Brooke’s declaration that Britain had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. A three-day IRA ceasefire followed over Christmas 1990.

There were inconsistencies in Thatcher’s approach but she was pragmatic and – especially – open to advice, indeed often specifically seeking it. She was also open to powersharing and an all-Ireland dimension. Herself an “English” unionist (or nationalist), she often disliked Ulster unionist politicians. Although determined not to “let the terrorists win”, she realised the difficulty of militarily defeating the IRA.

Translated fiction: Memory, history and the question of ‘sampling’ from other novels

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The Summer We Crossed Europe in the Rain; Ireland 1970-2020; Car Bombs and Barrack Busters

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Former US prosecutor on the justice system: ‘When I see kids come into court in chains, I can’t help thinking of slavery’

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An expert’s secret rules of drinking in an Irish bar

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This detailed and meticulously researched study, based on an examination of a wide range of archival sources and on first-hand interviews, shows that the development of events forced Thatcher and her governments into making more concessions than they had ever imagined making. It’s a compelling exploration of a central dimension of the Troubles.