Europeans have greeted Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy with alarm, questioning how Washington can remain an ally if it declares openly its intention to undermine the European project. But in China, the reaction has been muted, with foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun avoiding any direct criticism of the document.
“China stands ready to work with the US to maintain the steady development of the bilateral relationship and at the same time will firmly defend our sovereignty, security, and development interests,” he told reporters.
“The principle of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win co-operation is the right way for the two countries to get along and is the only realistic choice.”
Beijing’s reticence reflects the detente in relations with Washington that has prevailed since Xi Jinping’s meeting with Donald Trump in South Korea at the end of October. The two sides have de-escalated their trade disputes and this week saw Trump giving the green light to Nvidia to sell their second-most advanced chips to China.
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Nvidia’s H200 is more advanced than any AI chips available in China at present, including those made by Chinese manufacturers. And Democrats on Capitol Hill criticised the decision as throwing away the US advantage over China in critical AI technology.
For the first time since 1988 it does not condemn China’s governance system or call for the promotion of western-style democracy there
There is also a certain amount for Beijing to like in the National Security Strategy document, notably the fact that for the first time since 1988 it does not condemn China’s governance system or call for the promotion of western-style democracy there. And its assertion of the primacy of nation states over “intrusive” transnational organisations, endorsing the general principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, will be music to the Chinese Communist Party’s ears.
But if the contest between the Washington and Beijing is no longer framed as a battle between democracy and autocracy, the document leaves no doubt about the fact that China remains America’s primary economic and strategic adversary. And many of its policies are designed to contain or eliminate China’s presence in everything from global supply chains to the sea lanes of the western Pacific and the entire western hemisphere.
The first regional priority in the security strategy is restoring American pre-eminence in the western hemisphere, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. That involves, among other things, “making it harder for non-Hemispheric competitors to increase their influence in the region”.
China has been increasing its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years through projects like the $3.5 billion Chancay mega-port outside the Peruvian capital, Lima, a direct hub between South America and Asia. Beijing this week published a new policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, positioning the region as a core partner in the Global South and promising development assistance with no political conditions attached.
Some China hawks in Washington were disappointed that the paper says that the US “does not support” any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, rather than saying it opposes any such change. But they can console themselves with the fact that it also fails to declare that the US opposes Taiwan independence.
We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone
There are more mentions of Taiwan than in previous National Security Strategies and the island is identified as important not only because of its dominant position in semiconductor manufacturing but also on account of its strategic position in the South China Sea. The document reaffirms Washington’s commitment to protecting the “first island chain”, a strategic term that sees Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines as a barrier between China and the open Pacific Ocean.
“Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the US economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” it says.
“We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend – and more importantly do – much more for collective defence.”
The problem with Washington’s message to allies like Japan and South Korea is that Trump’s approach to the Ukraine war and the National Security Strategy’s dismissive approach to Europe undermines the credibility of the US security guarantee. Like the Europeans, America’s East Asian allies will stump up more cash for their own defence and in both cases, this spending will serve to diminish their dependence on the US guarantee.
The emergence of these states as more autonomous strategic players carries risks for China but it could also create an opportunity to reshape the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region.
