A religious fervour has seized the European project - the rush to integration is now an ideology, and everything outside this objective is seen as heresy, writes Hubert Védrine
It was after the ratification of Maastricht, in 1992, that things got out of hand. Why could the Twelve not be satisfied with the framework of the Maastricht Treaty and concentrate on the concrete problems of Europeans? Because two forces joined together in favouring a headlong rush forward, two forces that are in principle antagonistic: that of enlargement and that of political Europe.
For different reasons, Britain and Germany pushed ceaselessly for rapid enlargement to the European countries recently freed of Soviet domination.
Through the magic of statistics, this enlargement was presented as the way of creating a "450 million-strong power" in a world where only "heavyweights" matter. But also as a moral obligation to "redress Yalta" and the "abandonment of these countries to communism". This moral blackmail, which hid other calculations, took root in people's minds, in statements and in facts. It became indecent to question enlargement. After the euro, enlargement became by default the only great project of the union, an end in itself.
France tried several times to obtain a more manageable rhythm of enlargement, but had to pull back under fire from other members of the union who denounced French "egotism".
This is where the treaty race came from. It was because Maastricht did not establish the position of the new member states that we had to negotiate Amsterdam in 1996-97. And it was because of the failure of Amsterdam, for the same reasons, that we had to negotiate Nice. Nice was an imperfect response, but it made it possible for the union to function with up to 27 members; we could have worked in this framework.
But after Nice, the forces of political Europe joined others in stoking the fire. The commission, the parliament, the federalists, French proponents of integration, the media all found Nice too "intergovernmental". Together, they imposed the idea that Nice was a disaster, that we urgently needed a new treaty. Soon, a "new treaty" wasn't enough. It had to be a "constitution" and little did it matter that it was legally inappropriate. When the time came, the result had to be ratified. What tiny national parliament, what people would then dare to stand in the way of this new meaning of history? The results of the convention, at first deemed insufficient by maximalists, became the holy word when it was realised that selfish governments might water it down.
At every stage of this craze, from 1996 until 2005, a more reasonable choice could have been made, a calmer rhythm could have been adopted, that would not have deepened the gap between the elites and the population, that would have better consolidated the real Europe and spared us the present crisis.
But in saying this, I underestimate the religious fervour that has seized the European project. For all those who believed in the various ideologies of the second half of the 20th century, but survived their ruin, the rush into European integration became a substitute ideology.
They planned urgently to end the nation state. Everything outside this objective was heresy and had to be fought. This was in the spirit of Jean Monnet, the rejection of self and of history, of all common sense.
"European power" was a variation, the code name for a counterweight to America that excited France alone for years and towards which the "Constitution" was supposed to offer a magical shortcut.
And let us not forget the periodic French incantations for a Franco-German union. As the train sped on, these two groups, instead of braking the convoy, kept stoking the locomotive, some to enlarge, the others to integrate, deaf to the complaints coming from the carriages. Since we had to ask for confirmation from time to time, the recalcitrant peoples were told they had no choice, that it was for their own good, that all rejection or delay would be a sign of egotism, sovereignty, turning inward, hatred of others, xenophobia, even "Le Penism" or fascism.
But it didn't work. The passengers unhooked the carriages...
The aftermath of the two Nos confirmed how confused the link has become between European integration and the democratic expression of the peoples of Europe.
A treaty can only be adopted by unanimity of member states; everyone knows that. So why all these appeals from Brussels, Paris and elsewhere for "the process of ratification to continue in the name of democracy"? To put the French and Dutch people in the minority? And this immediate reaction from the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder: "It is more important than ever to set our sights on unification and enlargement."
So what's the point of referendums? If my hypothesis is correct - that it is maximalism and "Europe-ist dogma" that were disavowed, and not the European project - this must be acknowledged and political lessons learned.
This excludes the possibility of waiting for the storm to pass in the hope of starting over.
This brings me to five points:
1. Two prior clarifications are indispensable. First, we must stop expecting everything of Europe, the way we used to expect everything from the State. We must stop believing that there can be only a European solution to our problems, big and small. The cowardly corollary of this abdication is that all difficulties are ascribed to Europe. These are two sides of the same error which has only encouraged the feeling of democratic and civic dispossession, and made us irresponsible.
With each degree of integration, we must also stabilise the geography of Europe, which cannot be an ill-defined, infinitely extendable grouping. The 25 should state that there is a limit somewhere - probably a little beyond 25, but much less than the 46 members of the Council of Europe. That would already be reassuring.
2. Then, in the framework of existing institutions, what are our urgent tasks?
A compromise on the budget, which includes a certain increase in the amount and in the share for innovative policies.
Better co-ordination of economic policies in the euro zone.
A common foreign and security policy that preaches less to the rest of the world - a tendency that is becoming laughable - but concentrates on a few goals and works patiently to increase the number of subjects on which the 25 agree.
3. Drop the constitutional gamble for the time being. Go from the Utopia of the project to the reality of European projects, large and small, to be relaunched.
4. Our new European philosophy should be that there is no "model" but that, in every area, each member state may freely take inspiration from what works elsewhere. Let the commission suggest without trying to impose. Let us resist the temptation of caricatures such as Chirac versus Blair (Blairism is neither a panacea nor a bogey-man), social Europe versus liberal Europe, political Europe versus the "big market", Franco-German Europe versus Anglo-Saxon Europe. The only real gap is between the elites and the population. That is the dangerous one, which must be narrowed.
5. Finally, a great political and institutional debate is taking form. What lifestyle do we want in Europe? Can we combine growth, employment and ecology? And what do we want Europe to be and do in this world? We must let this debate go on for as long as necessary. Enlightened despotism, technocracy, however talented, and politicking have reached their limits. Our responsibility is to discern foundations where we see only dust and ruins, rebuild a solid, more realistic and stronger Europe, supported by her peoples.
We shall get there.
Hubert Védrine was France's minister for foreign affairs from 1997 until 2005. His most recent book is Face à l'hyperpuissance. Textes et discours, 1995-2003. - (Le Nouvel Observateur).
Tomorrow: Important sections of the constitution can be rescued and should not require a referendum, writes Peter Sutherland