ANALYSIS:Militants who spurn political engagement should expect a knock on their safe-house door
THE REAL issue after the killing of Osama bin Laden is what will happen to the other guests exploiting a safe haven in Pakistan. The safe havens are fundamental to the Afghan Taliban’s strategy for sustaining its war against the Kabul government and its Nato backers. The Taliban can now expect a new round of scrutiny of its operations in Pakistan. New approaches to the safe havens might even smooth the progress towards peace and a responsible winding down of Nato combat operations in Afghanistan.
The revelations about bin Laden in Abbottabad oblige all sides to face up to reality on the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan. Despite the movement’s clandestine approach, by this stage in the war plenty is understood about its leadership and command structures.
Many of the men are well known, from supreme leader Mullah Omar to figures like general military commander Qayyum Zakir or key network commander Siraj Haqqani. Every analyst of the Afghan war is now left wondering which suburbs Omar, Zakir, Haqqani and the others’ safe-houses are in. There is little point in apportioning blame. The point is what is to be done about it.
It is important to tackle the Taliban’s safe havens because otherwise Zakir and Haqqani are running a robust enough campaign to sabotage any hope of stability in Afghanistan. president Barack Obama’s decision to deploy more troops in 2010 was supposed to give his army the numbers required to drive the Taliban out of populated areas.
This winter American generals and leaders duly coined the phrase “fragile success” to claim progress. But now that a new fighting season is under way the Taliban is busily proving that Nato’s surge did not seriously dent its capacity. The first three months of 2011 saw insurgents launch an average of 35 attacks per day, 51 per cent up on the same period in 2010.
The Taliban did not much depend upon bin Laden and so the war stays stubbornly the same after his demise. It seems intent on demonstrating it can “ride out” anything the US throws at them. The Taliban fights on, so as to be ready to claim credit for the Nato forces’ exit when it eventually comes, so that it can go on to challenge for control of the country. There is a realistic prospect of civil war if the Taliban persists in the attempt.
In framing the response to the safe havens, it is worth reflecting on the Taliban’s classic asymmetric approach to its campaign. In most parts of the country the Taliban cannot stand and fight. Instead it harasses Nato and government forces with remote-controlled bombs along roads and paths. From ambush positions on mountain ridges insurgents fire machine guns and rockets at passing patrols. They intimidate or execute Afghan civilians accused of collaboration with foreign forces or the “puppet government”. None of these tactics gives them “liberated territory” – which is why command and control has to be located in a safe haven. But the tactics wear down the security forces and help break the links between administration and population.
Backed up by a slick media operation, spectaculars, like the May 7th and 8th raid which paralysed Kandahar city, help project an image of strength far beyond what the Taliban’s actual numbers might warrant. Like it or not, its sustained ability to mobilise thousands of committed young men means the Taliban has to be accepted as a significant Afghan faction. Anyone wanting to stabilise Afghanistan will have to deal with the Taliban. But the mere fact of its ability to keep fighting says nothing about the political weight it should have in any eventual settlement. If the Taliban ever does join a settlement process there will have to be much more to it than just a patch-up between armed factions. To understand the way the safe havens work you also have to examine the political geography of the conflict. The Afghan insurgency looks like a squashed shamrock astride the Pakistan-Afghan border. In 2011 the three regions along the border have accounted for 82 per cent of the insurgent violence.
One leaf is the Kandahari tribes fighting in the Afghan southwest, supported from Quetta. The second leaf is the Zadran and tribes of Paktia fighting in the Afghan southeast, with bases in Waziristan. The third leaf is the Safi and other tribes of the Afghan east, supported from the Peshawar Valley and adjoining tribal areas. The shamrock shape helps explain the command structure. There is a shura or army council for each of the three main regions. But commanders always take care to stress that they recognise the supreme authority of the Taliban’s national leadership – Mullah Omar and his adjutants. The point about leadership cohesion is important as it suggests that picking off bits of the insurgency might not work – the leadership can replace turncoats.
The best thing the US could do now as it takes up this safe haven issue would be to win Pakistani support for a diplomatic initiative to engage with the range of insurgent leadership across those three shamrock leaves. It will be far easier for Pakistan to co-operate with this initiative than with another round of kill or capture. Both Pakistan and the US have already said they favour political accommodation including the Taliban. As a civilian-led approach, it does not compromise Pakistani sovereignty. Remarkably, in 10 years of conflict, no real political engagement has happened on the Pakistan side of the border, despite the presence of the insurgent leadership. There have been years of speculation about whether the Afghan Taliban is prepared to join a political settlement. The post-bin Laden phase provides a golden opportunity for a last-chance offer to settle the matter. The reason it is important for a diplomatic team to engage in Pakistan, is to have access to a range of insurgent actors, develop confidence and build a consensus for a settlement. The approach is labour-intensive but more likely to deliver than trying to jump to set-piece talks in a third country as some advocate.
Of course no sane person would bank everything on the dialogue approach. It would have to be backed up by credible moves to ensure that the safe havens get closed down for any militants who insist on fighting on. The primary onus is on Pakistan to regain control of its territory, clamping down on those who support and direct unofficial military operations against its neighbour. But Pakistan’s progress is an issue of international concern – a threat to international security par excellence. The effort will have to be backed up by western intelligence on the militant networks, helping Pakistan choose smart ways to disrupt their operations.
Despite the scepticism, closing down militant operations is good for Pakistan’s own security. Militants who spurn the political engagement should expect a knock on their safe-house door.
If the initiative can convince the Afghan Taliban that there is a credible political process for it to join, at the same time that it sees the safe havens closing down, there is a fair chance of it giving up the idea of “riding out” Nato. But if parts of the Taliban turn down the chance of political engagement, in the absence of a safe haven militants will be far less able to thwart efforts for peace in Afghanistan.
Michael Semple is a regional specialist on Afghanistan and Pakistan, formerly with both the UN and EU. He is a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government