World reaction to the United States cruise missile attacks has been very mixed, which tells its own story about the advisability and acceptability of this military action. President Clinton sought to explain the uneven response from his European and Middle Eastern allies by asserting that they expect the US to act as a superpower, implying that they will come around to this way of thinking. It is an unconvincing case, because of the genuine differences between this episode and the configuration of international circumstances during the Gulf War six years ago after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, from which arise genuine disagreements between otherwise co-operative allies and friends.
Mr Clinton justified the missile attack by saying it will make Saddam Hussein pay a price for the latest act of brutality against the Kurds, and reduce his ability to threaten his neighbours or US interests. The Defence Secretary, Mr Perry, added that these interests include the continued flow of oil from the region. On the face of it these objectives look unexceptionable, particularly to a US electorate which is well accustomed to treating the Iraqi leader as a hate figure and which expects decisive presidential action when its national interests are threatened. This is ample justification for a unilateral action by the US, untrammelled by resort to the United Nations and its demonised Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
But awkward questions arise. Why pick on this particular brutal intervention by Saddam Hussein and not other and better examples of his viciousness so far as human rights are concerned? He is, after all, conducting a ground operation with a Kurdish faction which has aligned with him against opponents who have struck up an alliance with his regional antagonists, the Iranians. And what of Turkey's equally brutal intervention across the Iraqi border in pursuit of its war against its Kurdish minority? In any case, is not the principle of human rights intervention necessarily highly selective, when applied to the Middle East region?
It can also be argued that far from threatening his neighbours Saddam Hussein's intervention on this occasion against a Kurdish action supported by Iran helped to balance the region against growing Iranian power. This is taboo within the confines of the US's dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq, but not to those who take a different view, such as the many European and Middle East governments which argue the case for engaging these two states in diplomatic and trade dialogue, rather than isolating them. These include, notably, Turkey and France, both of which stand to benefit from the oil-for-food deal recently agreed with Iraq.
It is therefore not surprising that this action appears to many US friends and allies to be driven by specifically US interests and electoral politics. There is a worrying unilateralism about it that could contribute to growing tension between US and European governments, despite the support Mr Clinton has received from Britain and Germany. It could escalate, too, driven by the cat-and-mouse tactics for which Saddam Hussein has become notorious, with unpredictable consequences which would destabilise the Middle East region further. That is why diplomacy rather than violence is the better way.