The Kilmichael Ambush

Sir, - I refer to correspondence regarding the Kilmichael Ambush and the "false surrender" aspect

Sir, - I refer to correspondence regarding the Kilmichael Ambush and the "false surrender" aspect. For my book The Tom Barry Story (1982) I interviewed the ambush participants who were alive back to the early 1970s. All, including the last survivor, Ned Young (d.1989) and Paddy O'Brien (d.1979) spoke of the "surrender call' by the Auxiliaries and their resumption of shooting. Unlike Peter Hart, none of the participants of the ambush to whom I spoke asked me to keep their names confidential, and I have no problem with giving reference names, dates, etc. I would stress that I spoke to and questioned them while their memory was vivid, and this is important.

I grew up in the area and I listened to people get very angry that "The Auxies" picked up their guns after their surrender cries. My uncle, Pat O'Donovan, was in Section 2, where the three volunteers who were fatally shot were positioned. He, like others, said that he heard "the surrender call' in that evening atmosphere of the Kilmichael countryside.

The suggestion made by Peter Hart that there was no false surrender is based to an extent on a report that allegedly was written by Tom Barry and was later captured. Peter Hart chooses the absence of the mention of a false surrender in this report as a proof that there was no false surrender. As Brian Murphy has pointed out (August 10th), this report is not an original hand-written account, nor is it dated; nor indeed has it any of the characteristics to show it is authentic. It is typed into an official record with quotation marks. Furthermore, it was typed after the Truce because it mentions Barry as being "afterwards appointed Liaison Officer." It has all the hallmarks of a propaganda work. Basic elements point to a forgery. Most of the sentences contain elements that are at variance with written versions and also with that of participants' information.

To begin with: If Tom Barry wrote this report for his superiors, he would surely have got the number of men under his command correct. The first sentence has the time incorrect (important to Barry); the second has 32 men, instead of the correct 36 men. That sentence also mentions 100 rounds of ammunition per man. With that amount Barry could have stormed Macroom Castle!

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This report (allegedly Barry's) states that the column left its Kilmichael position at 4.15 p.m. and "about five minutes after the start we sighted two enemy lorries . . . I decided to attack the lorries." Peter Hart agrees that this is incorrect, that the column remained in position; however, he suggests that Barry wrote this because "he hadn't told his superiors, so he claimed it was an accident" (September 14th) as the ambush "was unauthorised and outside brigade boundaries" (September 1st).

The facts are: The ambush was sanctioned by Liam Deasy and Charlie Hurley who both visited the training camp the previous week, and who were in consultation with Cork No. 1 brigade personnel. I have Deasy's word for this. Deasy also mentions the "maturing" of ambush plans in Towards Ireland Free. The exact location and ambush plans were left to Barry. The ambush was outside brigade boundaries because of the terrain. The Macroom-based Auxiliaries who had been raiding the Third West Cork Brigade area had to be apprehended in the stretch of road before Gleann crossroads.

This report has Barry saying he hurriedly divided his column into three sections when they "sighted" two lorries. There is no mention of the sub-sections that were an extremely important device by Barry.

Peter Hart (September 1st) suggests that by claiming the ambush was "an accident" Barry "ensured" that he "could stay in charge." If Barry was trying to impress fellow officers, then from a guerilla tactical viewpoint of preparedness, they would be fools to leave him in charge.

Just to refer to some of the terminology in this report that has all the aspects of one written, from a barrack viewpoint:

(a) "We camped in that position." They didn't camp, they got into ambush positions, which is what Barry would have said.

(b) ". . .and then decided that as the enemy searches were completed." Barry would have used the words "raids" or "rampages", the barrack would have used "searches".

(c) "One wounded and escaped, and is now missing." Barry knew that one escaped, how did he know whether he was "now missing"? In Macroom Castle they knew he was "now missing".

(d) In a short report on an ambush, would Barry write, "the action was carried out successfully" against "the Auxiliary Police from Macroom Castle" (giving them their full title)?

As pointed out by Brian Murphy (August 10th), Piaras Beaslai mentioned the false surrender at Kilmichael. This is significant, as Beaslai wrote his book in 1923/24. Also significant is the first full account and mention of the false surrender, written by Kilmichael Section Commander, Stephen O'Neill (1937) - all prior to Barry's full account.

Barry himself accepted full responsibility for the order to shoot outright "soldiers who had cheated in war." Because of the death of his comrades, he regretted for the rest of his life that he had not thought to warn his men "of the old war trick of a false surrender." Tom Barry placed great emphasis on exactness; he was upright and direct. I believe that to record for history that Tom Barry told lies regarding the Kilmichael ambush, and that he evaded responsibility, does not do justice to history nor to Tom Barry. - Yours, etc., Meda Ryan,

Cusack Road, Ennis, Co Clare.