If anything is to come from the thinking which has now emerged on the linked issues of arms decommissioning and the establishment of Northern Ireland's new executive, it must represent the last chance for a solution before the onset of Drumcree and the marching season. The British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, has fixed the end of June as the final deadline for agreement, without specifying what would happen then in the event of failure. But he may be taken broadly at his word. The two governments have applied extraordinary ingenuity and energy in seeking to devise a formula which is acceptable to both the IRA/Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists. They cannot go on doing so indefinitely.
What is now under consideration may embrace elements of the thinking which was advanced successively by Mr Seamus Mallon and Mr John Hume. This provided for the effective termination of the executive if, by May of next year, the party's paramilitary associates in the IRA have not decommissioned their arsenal. Under Mr Mallon's proposals, the SDLP would trigger this mechanism. Under Mr Hume's proposals, Sinn Fein would undertake to expel itself in the event of a failure by the IRA to adhere to the requirement of the Belfast Agreement. Initial reactions to both these proposals by Sinn Fein and unionists alike were negative. But it may be, that a formula for success - with sanctions perhaps implied if not stated - can be identified somewhere in this area of thinking.
It is certain, nonetheless, as it has been since the emergence of this impasse some months ago, unless there is compromise and flexibility on both sides, that there will be no solution and there will be no executive. The greater burden of such compromise rests, as it has done, on the shoulders of the IRA/Sinn Fein.
There has been a repeated insistence from the IRA that it will never, in any circumstances, decommission its weapons - an insistence which is in flagrant violation of the terms of the Agreement. And Sinn Fein has yet to declare publicly that it can or will persuade the IRA to shift off that absolute position.
Presumably, it is the conviction of the two governments that this can and will happen. If it does not, even the spark of optimism of recent days is unwarranted and the process may as well be wound up now.
It is also clear, if a formula is to be attempted along the lines which now appear to be emerging from Friday's Downing Street discussions, that the unionists are going to have to swallow the concept of an executive, or a shadow executive, which will come into existence without their earlier demands on prior decommissioning having been met. There can be little doubt that this will cause serious problems for Mr David Trimble with even the most loyal and supportive of his followers. The coming days may present a real challenge to his authority within the party after a period in which his stature has grown and his leadership has become more firmly established.
Yet again, attention will focus upon General John de Chastelain and his independent commission to supervise the decommissioning process. Any new set of arrangements along the lines indicated will require clarity as to dates and methods. There will have to be clear understandings as to verification procedures. And there will have to be the utmost good faith. General de Chastelain is not the sort of man who will be complicit in a fudge or in any dishonesty. He will demand, as he will deliver, straight dealing.
But it is far from certain at this stage, that matters will advance at all to the point at which the General's expertise and intervention may be called upon.