HOW secure is a minority government which depends upon Independent deputies for support?
Governments here have had a rather poor experience in this regard. Three minority governments have been defeated - one in 1944 (which was reelected), and two in 1982, which were not. Seven others have chosen to go to the country well before the end of their term, either to preempt what seemed to be an imminent defeat or else in the hope of securing an overall majority.
Only twice did an outgoing minority government secure an overall majority - Eamon de Valera in 1933 and 1938. However, although the September 1927 election left Cumann na nGaedhael in a minority, as it had been after Fianna Fail's entry to the Dail after the June election that year, it returned to office because it won more seats from Labour, farmers and Independents than Fianna Fail.
In 1989, Fianna Fail, despite losing four seats, returned to government but in coalition with the Progressive Democrats. The other three governments which sought, in 1951, 1954 and 1957 to pretempt a defeat in the Dail, all lost office.
Only one, the Lemass led minority government of 1961-1965, survived without being defeated or having to go to the country within three years. There was, however, another which, having suffered a Dail defeat and having resigned, was reinstated by the Dail without an election being called. That happened in 1930 to the Cumann na nGaedhael government elected in September 1927.
Independents were responsible for two of the three defeats of minority governments which led to elections - in 1944 and January 1982. Doubts about their continuing support certainly contributed to other preemptive dissolutions of the Dail.
For Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, that is not an encouraging history. Such a government looks like starting with the disadvantage of depending on support from two opposite ends of the political spectrum so far as Northern Ireland is concerned.
The divergent approaches of Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats to the North do not necessarily preclude successful handling of Northern Ireland policy. Indeed their need to reconcile divergent attitudes to the peace process might even help ultimately to ensure a balanced approach.
However, if in addition to receiving probable support from Mildred Fox, a new government finds itself dependent upon the support of one or more of Jackie Healy Rae, Harry Blane, and perhaps Caoimhghin O Caolain of Sinn Fein severe tensions on Northern Ireland policy could arise.
We have already seen Harry Blaney raising a doubt about his support for the election of a Fianna Fail Taaoiseach who proposes to enter a coalition with a party which is opposed to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution in their present form.
While Jackie HealyRae has denied saying he would make his former colleagues "crawl" for his support, he nevertheless has made a number of awkward demands.
THERE are other possibilities which Bertie Ahern could explore, such as Tony Gregory and Thomas Gildea, but if the opposition parties refuse to provide a Ceann Comhairle - as opposition parties normally do when governments have small potential majorities - Tony Gregory might be the best bet, which would deprive the new government of his vote in the election of the Taoiseach.
It has been suggested, on a postelection discussion on RTE radio, by Tim Pat Coogan, Gemma Hussey, and Fintan O'Toole, that a new problem for Fianna Fail might emerge from the resumed Dunnes inquiry. Although this may be no more than a rumour, its emergence must be disturbing for Fianna Fail.
There is no doubt, despite all this, Bertie Aherne will be elected Taoiseach in 12 days, but his tenure must be somewhat uncertain, especially as it will be vulnerable to the loss of seats in by elections.
That by elections can modify the balance in the Dail sufficiently to change a government was shown in 1994 when Democratic Left victories in by elections made possible the emergence of a Rainbow Coalition - a combination which after the 1992 election had lacked an overall majority.
Moreover, three times since the early 1950s, Fianna Fail has ended up with a Dail strength which, because of by elections, was different by a margin of three from that with which it had started. Between 1954 and 1957 and again in government, between 1965 and 1994, it gained three seats, but more ominously for Bertie Ahern it lost three seats between 1973 and 1977.
If a government formed on June 26th were to lose three seats to the Rainbow parties in by elections, it would end up with no more seats than the opposition, 78, the balance held by the Green Party, Sinn Fein and seven Independents.
Fianna Fail has ended up in this situation because, unlike Fine Gael, it failed to increase its electoral support. It can be argued that this was in some measure because of a drift of votes from what might be described as government forming parties to microparties and In dependents.
However much of this drift appears to have been from Labour to smaller parties and Independents, especially in Dublin, and it seems unlikely that without this, Fianna Fail would have been more than two percentage points better off. That would have taken it to 41 per cent of the first preference vote still a poor result for the party.
Fianna Fail's present difficulties arise from this failure and while it made a net gain of nine seats in this election, five of these were at the expense of their putative government partners, the Progressive Democrats.
THERE were only four net gains at the expense of the Rainbow Coalition because, in addition to losing seats in Kerry South and Donegal South West to Independents, it also lost one of its Cavan Monaghan seats to Sian Fein and seats in Limerick West and Mayo to Fine Gael.
It was also unlucky that the constituency redistribution cost it a second seat in Mayo. It was Fine Gael and Labour which were the beneficiaries of the new seat distribution winning new seats in Galway East and Kildare South. (The other suppressed seat, in South Tipperary, had no impact on the relative positions of the parties.
In effect the seat which disappeared there was that of the former Ceann Comhairle, Independent, Sean Treacy).
For the Progressive Democrats the scenario is also testing. They will, I am sure, be generously treated by Bertie Ahern in terms of ministerial positions and no one need doubt that he and Mary Harney have a good personal relationship, which is half the battle.
However the extreme imbalance between the sizes of the two parties - even greater than in 1989-1992, the intensity of the dislike of the Progressive Democrats by many people in Fianna Fail and ultimately tensions between Fianna Fail pragmatism and PD dogmatism - all of these are liable to create tensions of a kind that did not exist in the Rainbow Coalition. {CORRECTION} 97060900001