THE DEEPENING quagmire of United States policy in Afghanistan has been made much worse by the weekend massacre of villagers in Kandahar province by a US soldier.
It comes after several other physical and cultural atrocities by US troops, possibly provoked by intensifying retaliatory attacks. Together they tell a sorry story of occupation fatigue and rage among Nato forces there, along with increased pressure for more rapid withdrawal and budget cutbacks from their own public opinions.
These murders are blamed by US authorities on a lone deranged soldier who will be subject to the full force of their military law. Because of the other atrocities and growing resentment over US military tactics from enemies and allies alike, many Afghans simply disbelieve this account. A recent US intelligence report found the animosity of Afghan soldiers was fed by traffic disruption caused by US convoys; indiscriminate US fire that causes civilian casualties; the use of flawed intelligence sources; US road blocks, night raids, violation of female privacy during searches; past massacres by US forces; and rudeness, disrespect and arrogance in dealing with Afghan soldiers. US troops complained of illicit drug use, “massive thievery,” incompetence, corruption, alliances with insurgents, laziness and poor hygiene among their Afghan counterparts.
All this makes for a poisonous atmosphere in which to negotiate several major issues, including who should conduct night raids to capture insurgents, approve drone attacks and arrange a longer-term “strategic partnership agreement” with the US to follow withdrawal of Nato troops over the next two years. The US hopes this can be reached soon to prevent European Nato states pulling out earlier, but this latest atrocity will set that back. Nor has there been any real progress made in arranging peace negotiations with the Taliban.
A negotiated political agreement between the Afghan government, its international allies and neighbours and its enemies – including the Taliban – is the only realistic alternative to this prolonged war. The increased security defended by the Obama administration as the outcome of continued fighting and the troop surge he ordered in 2009 is a more and more unconvincing case. President Karzai of Afghanistan is impossibly torn between the conflicting objectives of fighting and negotiating, is unable to survive without outside support and is weighed down with limited domestic support and a reputation for gross corruption.
“Don’t invade Afghanistan!” That ancient piece of strategic advice to imperial powers has been resurrected in recent debate on how this latest invasion should be brought to an end. It is of scant use to those contemplating pulling out, no matter what the provocation which put them there. That requires political negotiations. The complex balance of forces involved should be able to ensure minimal conditions to protect the rights and interests of the contending parties if the will is there to find a solution. The US should intensify that search.