Ireland’s future lies firmly in the EU but it can never be at the heart of Europe

The war in Ukraine reveals our increasing detachment from key areas of EU policymaking such as security, defence and energy

In her state of the union address before the European Parliament, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen was explicit in stating that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed everything for the European Union. In noting that “never before has this parliament debated . . . with war raging on European soil”, she was acknowledging the terrible uncertainties of military conflict.

Because in the coming winter war, Europe will simultaneously attempt to reorient and maintain its energy supply, support consumers from surging prices while also increasing spending on security and defence. All this, in addition to maintaining political unity on Ukraine, integrating millions of Ukrainian refugees and staving off economic collapse.

Success is by no means guaranteed. A deep recession in the euro zone is inevitable. Political fissures driven by economic realities – with Hungary and Poland in the lead – are already apparent.

However, as Europe struggles to stay afloat this winter, Ireland’s peripheral position in these battles is coming into focus. Because far from being at the heart of these debates, the ongoing war has actually exposed Ireland’s increasing detachment from key areas of EU policymaking.

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Take security and defence.

As the EU integrates, Dublin remains content to allow Britain to control Irish airspace and territorial waters in a time of crisis. This is a level of dependence deemed unimaginable – and completely unacceptable – by every other EU member state

The basic function of any state is to, in the words of the Slovenian government, “deter any attack on the state, defend its independence and inviolability, and preserve its integrity”. Unfortunately, through decades of political disinterest, Ireland’s Defence Forces continue to lack the capabilities to fulfil any of these functions.

The situation is so abject that even the additional funding announced in July 2022 (€400 million by 2028) will do little to improve Ireland’s defensive readiness. So while the war in Ukraine has stimulated expansive debates on EU security and defence policy, on the role of Nato (with previously neutral Sweden and Finland applying to join), on Germany’s position and on the greater co-ordination of military assets, Ireland remains a largely disinterested spectator – with no real desire to seriously interrogate the status quo.

As the EU integrates, Dublin remains content to allow Britain to control Irish airspace and territorial waters in a time of crisis. This is a level of dependence deemed unimaginable – and completely unacceptable – by every other EU member state.

In energy policy too, Ireland’s ingrained dependence on Britain can no longer be ignored. Dublin is praying a mixture of gas arriving via Britain (about 75 per cent of total Irish supply) and Irish wind will keep the lights on this winter.

The reality is that Ireland is part of a highly integrated British Isles energy network. Three interconnectors link the Irish and Northern Irish power grids. A further two link Ireland to other parts of the United Kingdom.

Ireland’s lone proposed link to France remains at least four years away from completion. The Irish offshore wind industry is two decades behind Britain’s (a global leader). Despite the crowing from Dublin about its “game changing” potential, Irish offshore wind won’t be blowing to European households anytime soon.

Unlike the rest of the EU, Ireland has not taken radical action to reshape its energy security in the wake of the Ukraine war. While von der Leyen explicitly singled out the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) for investing in liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, they are only part of Europe’s great energy upheaval.

Germany, Italy, Belgium, Finland and others are boosting LNG storage, expanding the life of existing nuclear power plants and radically strengthening their energy security. This is not just about reducing dependency on Russia, it is a strategic shift towards a co-ordinated European energy policy.

Ukraine really has changed everything in Brussels and soon Ireland will have to decide how ‘European’ it really wants to become

Ireland, however, remains content to rely on Britain.

So much for Brexit ushering in a more “European” Ireland.

What the war is also showing is that while Ireland’s future lies firmly in the EU, it can never lie at the heart of Europe. The maintenance of easy, historic dependencies on Britain trumps the political bravery needed to really reorient Ireland towards the European mainstream.

Ireland will never join the Schengen free travel area (owing to the priority to retain a common travel area with Britain). Dublin will remain hopelessly irrelevant to the EU’s security and defence debates (due to a lack of resources and unwillingness to engage in serious change). Any Irish role in the emerging EU energy union is circumscribed by our existing ties with Britain.

In fact, the Irish “opting out” from so many EU policies mirrors Britain’s creeping detachment from Brussels in the early 1990s. Then Britain chose not to join Schengen, the euro or aspects of the EU’s security and justice legislation. The path to Brexit was eased by Britain’s already established role as a semi-member of the wider integration process.

To avoid this silent, creeping detachment, Ireland needs to dial down the rhetoric about being “at the heart of Europe”. Instead, Brussels would likely prefer a more realistic engagement based on Ireland’s practical dependencies on Britain and economic reliance on US investment. Economics, not bloated aspiration, should be the bind of Ireland’s future engagement with Europe.

In framing the Ukraine conflict as a “war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future”, von der Leyen is laying the groundwork for a deeper, more integrated EU. Ukraine really has changed everything in Brussels and soon Ireland will have to decide how “European” it really wants to become.

Eoin Drea is a senior researcher at the Wilfried Martens Centre, the official think tank of the European People’s Party of which Fine Gael is a member