The Northern Ireland conflict has been framed by international events as well as national ones. This has been especially the case so far as its potential resolution is concerned.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 set the stage for a much more intense effort to agree a peace process involving cross-community relations in Northern Ireland, North-South relations and those between the Republic and Britain. Security considerations in Britain and the US no longer restrained them from declaring there was no strategic interest in Northern Ireland, setting the scene for the 1993 Downing Street Declaration and President Clinton's intense involvement in the peace process.
In the same way September 11th will be seen to have set the scene for the IRA's decision this week to begin decommissioning. The attacks on New York and Washington transformed the international security environment, putting paramilitary involvement on a completely different footing. Whatever residual justification might have existed for distinguishing between nationalist-defensive paramilitary activity and international terrorist movements was irretrievably compromised by the Colombian affair. Sinn FΘin's supporters in the US, many of them victims of the Twin Towers attack, could no longer tolerate the contradictions involved.
Commenting on the IRA decision Gerry Adams said: "This is a huge moment in the history of our island \ in the relationship between our island and the island of Britain". He spoke of saving a peace process which locks republicanism into continuing partition based on consent and power-sharing within a UK framework. His party aspires to a united Ireland; but will it be in his lifetime?
The Taoiseach, Mr Ahern, in his address to the Fianna Fβil ardfheis on October 13th said: "We will work with the new Northern Ireland, not against it. Indeed there would be nothing to prevent the new institutions with their strong safeguards for both communities from continuing, even in the event of agreed constitutional change." The political logic of that position leads to a federal Ireland, should the consent principle yield a vote for unity, as provided for in the Belfast Agreement.
That Mr Ahern's statement did not attract headlines expresses very well what a sympathetic observer of British-Irish relations, Philip Stephens, described yesterday in the Financial Times as the "barely disguised contempt" with which many in the Republic look on Northern Ireland. "Viewed from Dublin," he writes, "it is an economically backward society, held back by a culture of State dependency, riven by sectarianism and scarred by paramilitary gangsterism." The aspiration to unity is an exceedingly long-term one on this account, with little willingness to fund it. Mr Ahern's commitment not to enter into a coalition with Sinn FΘin unless the IRA disbanded is part and parcel of such attitudes.
In fact the primary focus of successive Irish (and British) governments' policy on Northern Ireland has been stability, not unity. That gives the new institutions in the North an opportunity to bed down and become democratically self-governing, assuming the UUP agrees to participate. It is up to the Secretary of State to call a referendum on unity, as provided for in the Belfast Agreement with intervals of seven years between them. Although the agreement does not state precisely when a referendum would be called it is assumed there would have to be well-founded evidence of a shift in attitudes.
Demographic change in the North is conventionally believed to chart the shift towards a possible majority for unity. But sizeable numbers of nationalists would prefer to remain in the UK. However the sovereignty question is resolved the same guarantees will have to be extended to both communities as are contained in the Belfast Agreement. Thus a federal Ireland should be assumed by those who believe unity likely in the next 10-20 years. That may spur demands for regional government in the Republic.
There will be renewed focus on the North-South bodies and on the British-Irish Council once the North's institutions begin to function properly again. Sinn FΘin and the SDLP assume there will be gradual political spillover in favour of unity from developing North-South co-operation. Unionists are satisfied that can be contained by strict inter-governmentalism and consensus within these bodies and the guarantees contained in the consent principle.
The British-Irish Council will also have a greater role to play. Its development has been constrained by the need to concentrate on saving the agreement. There will now be greater opportunities to grow closer relations between all the devolved administrations in the UK, Westminster and the Republic. Much will depend on how the UK itself develops in coming years. Assuming devolution beds down firmly in Scotland and Wales and is gradually extended to the English regions this could become a much more active political agenda. But it will be less so if power remains centralised in Westminster.
Tony Blair's overwhelming majority and strong public standing should not disguise this unresolved issue in British politics. This week there have been more hints that the promised referendum on the euro may be held in 2003. Assuming Mr Blair retains public support a referendum is more likely to be won than lost. If it were to be lost the stability of the UK itself would be jeopardised by Scottish and Welsh impatience with English euro-scepticism. This admittedly unlikely scenario would probably put Irish unity on the agenda more rapidly than anyone now expects.
That reminds us that the international framing of the Northern Ireland conflict is European as well as transatlantic. A federalising UK in a federalising EU would, paradoxically, underwrite stability more effectively than the British sovereignty most unionists prefer; whereas Irish unity could be precipitated by a victory for euroscepticism in England.
