Goethe wrote that "two ages met" at the Battle of Valmy in 1792 and Hilaire Belloc expanded on that theme. Historians have since contended that it was not quite a clash of ardent revolutionaries and an outdated social/military system. But the basic concept is applicable to Afghanistan. A mediaeval mind-set met the modern age and lost decisively.
The formal Afghanistan War is over. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have lost after making less of a fight than some expected. The conclusion was inevitable. Afghan history, bin Laden organisation and Taliban fanaticism claimed invincibility. These are no substitute for training, equipment, maintenance and good war tactics.
One cannot blame those who succumbed to the devastating air bombardment but they should have known enough to leave the built-up areas earlier and by night. With no effective air defences in urban areas they were also easy targets for artillery attacks.
Leaving the cities and towns and getting close to Northern Alliance troops for guerrilla action might have reduced Taliban vulnerability to bombing. But they tended to wait too long, particularly at Mazar-e-Sharif, from which they fled in open pick-ups under air attack. Urban life and years of bullying women and children may have softened their physical and mental toughness.
Withdrawals became more orderly towards the end, but there were few signs of determined guerrilla counter-attacks. Kabul fell unexpectedly swiftly. There was some tough, but fairly brief fighting at Kunduz, Kandahar and in the White Mountains. Some brief, doomed rallies were tried.
The anti-Taliban forces benefited from air support, re-equipment, Special Operations Forces' (SOF) help and advice, as well as freedom of movement and manoeuvre. Liaison between the anti-Taliban forces and the SOF worked well. It seems that, since the Kosovo War, the Americans have made remarkable improvements, and not just in accurately indicating enemy and friendly troop locations. They got close to the goal of getting ground information, in digital and imaging forms, into the cockpit displays and pilot headsets of strike aircraft in real time.
Laser "illumination" of targets, using the effective new Ground Laser Target Designators (GLTDs) was successful. Special Operations troops got their GLTD (about the size of two shoeboxes) to within 10 km of a ground target, such as a HQ or an artillery position. The target designator placed a "laser spot" on the target. A laser spot tracker on an aircraft can then get greatly improved missile and bombing accuracy. Artillery can also use this system.
A Satellite Global Positioning System (GPS), first introduced in the Gulf War, was also much used. Hand-held portable lightweight GPS receivers got positions from satellites, accurate to within six metres. The SOF could pass the information to aircraft by radio or portable computer.
We should remember that the skies were American; there was no interceptor/fighter opposition and little anti-aircraft fire and, importantly, the skies were also clear.
So the new factors - close association with "the enemy of my enemy" and improved information technology and procedures - have transformed the battlefield.
A very small number of special forces called in accurately designated air attacks which enabled the anti-Taliban forces to win.
In past wars, senior commanders such as MacArthur and Montgomery opposed special forces - because they deprived line units of their best leaders. The US special forces had failures, in Vietnam, Grenada and Iran. Gen Schwarzkopf opposed their presence in his command.
Their performance in Operation Desert Storm changed his view. They have implemented a remarkable set of changes in waging war.
Col E.D. Doyle is a former Director of Signals who spent much of his career in operations.