Iraq: Without proof that Saddam's sons were killed Iraqis fear the two men are still hiding, reports Michael Jansen
While the Bush administration is expressing satisfaction over Tuesday's US assault on a mansion in Mosul which it said killed Saddam Hussein's two sons, Iraqis are not quite convinced that Uday and Qusay have, in fact, been eliminated.
During a briefing yesterday in Baghdad, Lieut Gen Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of US ground forces, declared that the bodies of the two men had been identified by senior members of the former regime and through dental and medical records. But Iraqi pressmen insisted that until photos of the corpses were published in the local media, Iraqis would express doubts about their identities. Although it had been expected that photographs would be produced, the general said this was still being debated in Washington.
President Bush, who addressed the media shortly after Lieut Gen Sanchez, also failed to present the images Iraqis wanted to see. Following Arab coups, gruesome photographs of the bodies of toppled rulers have usually been circulated rapidly after the event. Iraqi journalists attending the general's briefing expressed impatience and frustration over the US delay in providing such images.
For most Iraqis, "seeing is believing". By hesitating, the US failed to exploit the immediate propaganda value of Tuesday's dramatic events to win unreserved Iraqi approval of the elimination of the two members of the former regime Iraqis most hate and fear.
This delay could cause Iraqis to suspect that perhaps the corpses the US is holding are Uday and Qusay lookalikes and that the two men are still hiding somewhere in Iraq. This could gain widespread belief because in Iraq there is a centuries-old tradition of a leader reappearing after years in hiding. Iraqi analysts warn that the US failure to comprehend the Iraqi way of thinking was undermining the occupation regime.
Thoughtful Iraqis were also critical of the way the siege and storming of the Mosul villa was handled. They would have preferred a protracted siege leading to the capture of the two men, their detention and trial for crimes against their own people. This would have given Iraqis a feeling of closure and made them believe, at long last, that their ordeal under the Takriti clan is over.
Iraqis argue that Saddam's sons would have been important intelligence assets who might have known the whereabouts of their father and other wanted men and, perhaps, even alleged weapons of mass destruction.
The killing of Uday and Qusay, numbers two and three on the US list of most wanted Iraqis, and the arrest yesterday of number 11, Barzan al-Takriti, a half-brother of Saddam and former commander of the Special Republican Guard, boosted the morale of US troops in Iraq. Hopes were expressed by Gen Sanchez and ordinary soldiers that these developments would reduce the number of attacks carried out by the Iraqi resistance on US forces.
This would seem to be a vain hope, as illustrated by the deaths yesterday of two more US soldiers.
Iraqis argue that these deaths were not in revenge for the killing of Uday and Qusay. The former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Mr Muhammad al-Douri, made the point that Saddam and his sons no longer played an "effective role" in Iraq.
He would seem to be correct in assuming that senior members of the ousted regime are disconnected from most of the resistance groupings.
While the US insists that the resistance consists of old Baathists and former members of its security agencies and armed forces, the names adopted by organisations conducting operations against US forces suggest otherwise.
Among these groups are the Muslim Youths, the Islamic Armed Group of al-Qaeda, Wakefulness and Holy War, Liberating Iraq's Army, Ansar al-Islam, the Islamic Liberation Party, and the Organisation of the Jihad Brigades in Iraq. Most of these formations have chosen names indicating Islamist rather than secular Baathist coloration.
Iraqi commentators say the main motivation for the escalating guerrilla campaign is the US military occupation itself. To this must be added growing Iraqi anger over the US failure to restore security, electricity, communications, and water and to provide jobs for the workforce. The situation in Baghdad is said to be deteriorating in spite of US claims that it is improving.
Ultimately, Iraqis argue, the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds will be won by supplying the populace with utilities, services and work rather than staging public relations exercises after capturing discredited and powerless remnants of the old regime.