Kelly -v- University College Dublin
High Court
Judgment was given by Mr Justice Liam McKechnie on May 5th 2009.
Judgment
The applicant failed to have set aside a judgment of Mr Justice McKechnie who had refused to order the disclosure of documents from third parties in relation to applications for a place on a course in UCD leading to a master's in social science.
Background
This was an application arising out of a protracted challenge from the applicant to the decision of UCD not to offer him a place on the MSSc course for the academic period 2002-2004.
He challenged this on the grounds of gender discrimination, taking a complaint to the Equality Tribunal, which was a notice party in this application and which had rejected his complaint.
That decision was appealed to the Circuit Court, where it was still pending at the time of the judgment.
As part of the appeal process, Mr Kelly sought an order from the Circuit Court whereby he wanted inspection of documents submitted by those who had been offered and had taken up a place on the course.
UCD opposed this application on a number of grounds, including that they contained personal and sensitive information given in confidence.
The application was refused by the president of the Circuit Court, Mr Justice Matthew Deery and that decision was appealed to the High Court, where it was heard by Mr Justice McKechnie.
He upheld the decision of Mr Justice Deery. In these proceedings Mr Kelly was challenging that decision on the grounds that one of the witnesses for UCD, Suzanne Quin, who is head of the school of applied social science, had perjured herself in giving evidence as to the contents of the application forms.
He based this on the fact that she had stated that the personal statements sought in the course of the application process elicited in many cases private, confidential and intimate details about the personal circumstances and background of many of the applicants and their families.
Such information could include experience of sexual abuse, suicide, incest, substance abuse and traumatic family breakdown.
Mr Kelly examined this statement in the light of his cross- examination of Ms Quin, stating that during this cross-examination she admitted she had probably not read all the applications made in 2002 and that the examples given were not necessarily from the 2002 applications.
He argued from case law that the perjury tainted the decision given and a judgment obtained through fraud was "a nullity" and must fall.
Mr Justice McKechnie pointed out that the case law generally indicated that no civil action for perjury could be taken.
In relation to setting aside a judgment for fraud, he said the case law established the principle that a court may set aside a judgment where it was proven on the balance of probabilities that such judgment was obtained through the fraudulent testimony of one or more witnesses, that it was known of or instigated by the successful party and that it was material to the decision.
He rejected the plaintiff's contention that if any perjury was found it would "taint" the decision, causing it to fall.
Decision
Mr Justice McKechnie said that before concluding he wanted to make a few comments of a general nature. While it was the plaintiff's right to bring whatever motions he might see fit, "applications brought merely as collateral challenges upon matters on which the court had already ruled serve only to frustrate and protract proceedings".
He said the plaintiff had made multiple submissions which related to many matters already heard and ruled upon by the court, which sought to undermine the principle of finality in respect of court rulings.
Generally submissions were limited to one per party per application. He drew attention to a practice direction from the Chief Justice about the length of submissions. He also said that the pouring over the minutiae of transcripts was not a useful exercise.
In relation to the allegation of perjury, he said that the court had had the opportunity to hear and observe Ms Quin being cross- examined by the plaintiff. "There is for me no evidence that the court was being deliberately misled by Ms Quin," he said. "I thus conclude that there is no evidence of perjury in this case and that Ms Quin's evidence is beyond reproach in this regard.
I am satisfied that at all times she acted in good faith, with the intention of sincerely assisting the court."
Given this ruling, he said that any further allegations against her of perjury would undoubtedly amount to defamation.
He dismissed the plaintiff's application.
The full judgment is on www.courts.ie
The appellant appeared in person; John J McDonald & Co solrs appeared for the respondent. The name of counsel was not available.