Trying for peace, but losing power

"Albert walked with me as I was leaving down the magnificent granite steps of his palace in Ailesbury Road on Thursday morning. He was still talking about the beef tribunal when he broke off to say he was going to Thurles that afternoon to a race meeting. I inquired why. He said he had two horses running. I asked what were their names Snug Fit Rosie and Sub Rosa.

The house in Ailesbury Road is indeed a palace. It is a huge house, three storeys. The basement alone would be palatial for most middle-class Dubliners - there is nobody living there now since two of Reynolds's daughters moved out. The two main rooms on the main floor - the floor led up to by the granite steps - are magnificent. No, I didn't ask him where he got the money. Next time.

Kathleen Reynolds came in during the interview and brought us tea and coffee. She was looking far better than Albert was and in even better form.

Charlie Haughey instigated the peace process (although Albert dismisses this) and when Albert Reynolds came to office in February 1992 he gave it an impetus that resulted first in the Downing Street declaration of December 1993, the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 and, ultimately, the Good Friday agreement of 1998 and IRA decommissioning of this week. His relationship with John Major was crucial to the progress that was made while he was Taoiseach from February 1992 to December 1994.

VB: Did the issue of decommissioning ever arise in your discussions with John Major or the unionists while you were Taoiseach?

AR: It came up in October '94 with John Major. The last summit we had in Chequers. My response to him was that to highlight that or bring it to the top of the agenda would cause serious problems, that it was very sensitive. I said I would find a formula that would get it (decommissioning) out of the way.

VB: What did you have in mind?

AR The previous June, before the ceasefire, I had had a couple of meetings with the Combined Loyalist Command. The issue (of decommissioning) came up with them and they clearly understood the problems republicans would have getting rid of their arms. They said that maybe the way might be for the groups to meet and produce a formula between the two of them that would give the result (that was required) and that it might be easier to resolve it that way.

They were concerned that they mightn't meet the real decision makers in the republican movement and I said I couldn't guarantee who was a member of the IRA and who wasn't. But that if the delegation was led by Gerry Adams, was that a reasonable response and they said fine. I remember ringing Gerry Adams and I told him about this idea that came from them and he said, I asked him would he lead a delegation that they were concerned that they might not get to the decision makers and that they wouldn't know whether they were or they weren't but they didn't know who they were. He said, "They recognise me as a serious voice in the republican movement surely", so I went back to them and they said yes.

Shortly after that there was a very bad explosion in which people were killed (probably the Shankill bomb) and it went off the agenda for then.

To get back to that meeting in Chequers in October 1994, we spoke about it personally just ourselves for a good half an hour, maybe more, and then going into the official meeting. We agreed we would set up a committee to look at the modalities of decommissioning because they had a fair amount of arms and ammunition or what have you and that it was going to be a specialist job. I was gone in November/December and that was it.

VB: Of course contact with the republican movement had been going on before you became Taoiseach and Charlie Haughey briefed you on that just before you became Taoiseach in February 1992.

AR: No, that's not factual. It's not actually what happened. What you want to reflect on is, I was elected Leader of Fianna Fβil on a Wednesday, I didn't become Taoiseach until the following Tuesday. The first and only briefing I got from Charlie was on the Monday evening and the declarations of my political objectives had been made at the press conference on the Wednesday.

The briefing I got from Charlie Haughey, on the day before I was elected Taoiseach by the Dβil, was so short I can relate it to you almost word for word. Briefly what he was saying was, "look John Hume will probably come down and tell you about conversations we had going on with Gerry Adams. Martin Mansergh, if you're keeping him on (as adviser on Northern Ireland) will brief you in detail." I said, yes, I am keeping him. He said it will be your call and your judgment if you think there's anything in it or not. End of story.

VB: He didn't tell you about contacts that had been made with representatives of the republican movement?

AR: No. I found them out subsequently from Father Reid (of the Redemptorist monastery in Clonard, Belfast).

VB: Charlie Haughey's version of that is that he said to you, well you don't need to be briefed on matters generally because you had been a member of the cabinet up to the previous October/November and you knew what was going on but that there had been this secret contact with the republican movement.

AR: No. Definitely no. And the timing on that has been totally wrong too . . . I know that it was immediately after I was elected in the Fianna Fβil rooms. I went out to a press conference and that's what I said that I was going for peace, the economy and whatever, you know, the usual.

VB: Bertie Ahern has been very surefooted in his handling of the Northern Ireland issue. Have you been impressed by him?

AR (Long pause) Yeah. I mean you can't criticise somebody from your . . . I haven't criticised anybody . . . you need to be part of it to know exactly, to put forward objective criticism.

VB But have you been impressed by Bertie's handling of the Northern Ireland situation?

AR (Another pause) Yeah. But he was always a good negotiator. This was his forte, you know.

VB: Do you think he has been a good Taoiseach generally?

AR: Yeah. I don't see anything wrong with him. I mean you get an economy going, you get the North right at the end. Those were the two objectives I set out but I wasn't there long enough to try and achieve them. Not, at all, he's had a great run. And you need to be lucky too and he has been lucky, you know.

VB: Do you trust Bertie?

AR: (Very long pause) I'll leave that question. How can I answer that question in view of the treatment that was dished out to me in the presidential business (Bertie Ahern asked Albert Reynolds to be the Fianna Fβil candidate for the presidency in 1997 and then Mary McAleese emerged from nowhere to get the nomination.) We'll leave that for other people to judge.

VB: Apart from that, did you have reason to distrust him?

AR (Another long pause) Apart from that, well, there were times that the question would be in the mind, yeah.

VB: When you ran for the leadership against him in 1992 you were quite rough with him. I remember you made the comment at one stage that the people of Ireland have the right to know where the Taoiseach sleeps.

AR: I never said that. Never. You can go back on all the records you like, you will never see where I said that.

It was said by one of my ministerial colleagues who was still a member of the Government.

VB: There were suggestions, I think Bertie said it at one stage, that you might be an emissary on Northern Ireland negotiations but that was dropped too.

AR: Yeah. Oh the suggestion was made by him and, for whatever reasons, he didn't follow through.

VB: Of course, he had a prior commitment to Ray Burke.

AR: I'd say that he was the last man (Ray Burke) that would have wanted me around as an emissary

VB: Looking back on it all. Do you have any regrets about the two Governments falling while you were Taoiseach. Do you ever think "Oh God, I wish I hadn't done that"?

AR: Well, I didn't expect the first Government to fall.

VB: You could have backed off on the question of Harry Whelehan being appointed President of the High Court, appointed someone else president of the court and made Harry an ordinary judge of the High Court.

AR: That had nothing to do with it in the end. The issue had been agreed between the two of us (Dick Spring and himself)

They (Labour) had decided to pull out and it was coming for a good while.

VB: So, you don't think there was anything wrong in your handling of the events that led to the collapse of the two governments you headed?

AR: Well, if you call telling the truth mishandling something, fine, then I mishandled it.