ALMOST everyone got it wrong. The Sinn Fein internal conference in Letterkenny on July 24th, 1994, conveyed the mistaken and near universal impression that the party had turned its back on the peace process and that there would not, after all, be an IRA ceasefire.

The then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, was one of the very few who held firm to the belief that the Great Day could still dawn. The SDLP was deeply riven by the apparent snub from Sinn Fein to John Hume after Hume had put himself and his party on the line for peace.

There was a vociferous minority south of the Border which was sceptical about the whole peace making enterprise. Letterkenny lent weight to the view that Sinn Fein had been leading constitutional politicians like Hume and Reynolds up the garden path for short term gain.

This scepticism was reflected on the Labour wing of the coalition. The Taoiseach was almost totally isolated and the Government Press Secretary, Sean Duignan, recorded the following exchange in his diary: "Albert says: `You think it's gone, too, Diggy'. I say nothing, shrug. He says: `So, I'm in a minority of one'."

Senior Fianna Fail figures who were close to Reynolds at the time believe the reason the then Taoiseach held firm in the wake of Letterkenny was because he was "au fait with what the military command on both the loyalist and republican sides was actually doing".

A basis of trust had been established by allowing republicans and loyalists an input into the Downing Street Declaration of the previous December. Through intermediaries, republicans had contributed significantly to the wording of one important paragraph, loyalists to another. Both sets of paramilitaries "believed" in the straight talking Albert Reynolds, according to Fianna Fail sources.

Although the SDLP was in turmoil, it came as a "big surprise in government circles when Seamus Mallon issued a statement on August 18th that was scathingly critical of Sinn Fein and the IRA.

"Reynolds kept faith, which was an extraordinary feat on his part because there was practically no public evidence to support the stand he was taking," say those who were close to him at the time. They say Reynolds based his stance on "his own intuitive feeling" and on good information supplied by intermediaries who were holding discreet meetings with the paramilitaries on both sides.

There had been an update on the peace process at every government meeting, but precise details of contacts with republicans and loyalists were not spelled out and there was no close questioning on this score for fear of endangering lives. It was generally accepted that intermediaries for the government went "close to the bone" in their dealings with the activists, including face to face meetings with IRA members. "No one ever questioned or spoke about it."

On the constitutional side, comments from the unionist leader, James Molyneaux, in the lead up to the ceasefire, were seen to have a calming effect on the majority population in the North and were regarded as very constructive by the Fianna Fail Labour Government.

Molyneaux was crucial," say Fianna Fail sources. "He was kept fully informed by Dublin." This again was done through intermediaries. The Rev Martin Smyth also made conciliatory comments, which came as a complete surprise to Dublin.

A delegation from the United States led by former congressman Bruce Morrison had visited Ireland secretly in mid July and held a day long meeting with the Sinn Fein president, Mr Gerry Adams. The Americans outlined the prospects that would open up for Sinn Fein in the US in the event of a ceasefire. Morrison also relayed messages that summer between Adams and Nancy Soderberg, staff director of the National Security Council in the White House.

The same group returned to Ireland a few days before the ceasefire. They met Reynolds and Dick Spring in Government Buildings. Sources on the government side say the Americans "were talking in terms of a six month cessation" as an initial gesture but Reynolds informed them he had already told Sinn Fein this was completely unacceptable and if the delegation - reinforced that message to the republicans it would be doing a great service.

However, next day, when the Americans met Adams and Martin McGuinness at Connolly House in Belfast, Adams began the meeting with the words: "It's on.

Senior Fianna Fail sources believe that if President Clinton had failed to sanction a US visa for veteran republican Joe Cahill, the proposed ceasefire would have been called off or at least postponed. There was a "real danger" of a split among Sinn Fein's US supporters and someone with Cahill's prestige among republicans was needed to "steady the nerves".

Republican sources are still reticent about the detail of that month's events, but they are willing to provide their political analysis. They say the importance of having Reynolds on the scene was that, like the Americans, he was prepared to take a political risk; he also understood that if the peace process agenda was "dictated by the Brits" nothing would happen.

AUGUST 1994 marked a new stage in the growing consensus which began with Sinn Fein and the SDLP, went on to include the Irish Government, drew in Irish America in its widest sense and finally garnered the White House.

However loose and limited, this coalition of interests had a strength which, according to republican sources, "the British government could not possibly dismiss".

Republicans insist they were not surprised at the British government's lukewarm to negative response to the peace initiative.

"No republican trusts the Brits". But they still have no regrets: "It was worth doing because there was a good chance it could succeed - and there is still a chance."

The hope at the time was that the international consensus would prove so powerful Britain would have to "act with some sort of honour".

The essence of Sinn Fein's peace strategy was to make "a thrust towards a democratic resolution so strong that those elements that don't want one, i.e. the British government, find it very difficult to keep on stopping it". It was not a matter of dropping demands for British withdrawal and an end to partition. "It's quite the opposite, it's about trying to get there sooner.