Fall of the wall a catalyst for European integration

PAT COX

OPINION: The new European Commission must have strong self-belief that, in the new world of Lisbon, its mission is political and not merely administrative

LAST WEEK’S commentary on the fall of the Berlin Wall paid only modest attention to what this turning point in history meant for European integration. Twenty years ago, plans were already at an advanced stage to launch an intergovernmental conference to establish an economic and monetary union to complement the emerging single market.

Suddenly a tidal wave of hope and history washed over this carefully prepared policy terrain as Europe was confronted, for the first time since the second World War, with, in the words of Pope John Paul II, the challenge of “breathing through her two lungs East and West”.

There were anxieties in some quarters that, as German unification loomed larger on the political horizon, the European ideal would be eclipsed by a new powerhouse in Mitteleuropa, a kind of Germanified Europe.

Helmut Kohl, as German chancellor, stamped his authority on the alternative of a Europeanised and united Germany by promoting the idea of a political union to parallel the Economic and Monetary Union and committing Germany to lead the drive towards a common European currency to replace the iconic deutschmark.

The strong and stable deutschmark, managed by a fiercely independent Bundesbank, anchored the post-war economy and democracy of the Federal Republic. It stood strong, the answer to the collective German memory of hyperinflation, a collapsing currency and the imploding Weimar Republic that paved the way for the Nazis.

For Kohl, the euro and a shared European perspective would be the new anchor for the new Germany.

It fell to an Irish presidency of the European Community, led by Charles Haughey, in the first half of 1990 to formally place political union on the European Council agenda at a summit meeting in Dublin.

What resulted was the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), followed by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the failed attempt of the constitutional treaty and, finally, the Lisbon Treaty, due to enter into force on December 1st.

Separately and collectively, these represent a 20-year period of adjustment to the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall. They reflect the incremental nature of European integration and the difficulty of agreeing, unanimously, sensitive political trade-offs, especially when each successive enlargement added to the diversity of the union and the difficulty of securing unanimity.

From conception to birth, what finally emerged as the Lisbon Treaty was the most difficult, but not the most ambitious, of the treaties of the past two decades and its adoption marks a watershed in EU affairs. Common sense dictates that it will be the last of its kind.

Attention has now turned to the question of who will get the key appointments of president of the European Council and high representative for foreign policy. When the new architecture and personnel are in place, the question of “who” will yield to the questions of “what” and “how”.

A period of learning-by-doing is at hand. New actors assisted by new administrative structures run the risk of old-style turf wars which they should plan to avoid.

The new council president needs sufficient backing from the heads of state and government to get on with the job without constantly looking over his or her shoulder but also needs to avoid lording it over the other political institutions, especially the commission.

The new high representative will perform as well as the collective political will of the member states permits. The more often member states, particularly the larger ones, pursue an independent bilateral policy line with non-EU powers the more restricted will be the role and impact of this new office.

The democratic accountability of the system will be greatly enhanced through the new role for national parliaments and improved powers of the European Parliament. The latter can be expected to make maximum use of its new powers. For the European Commission, the terrain is more delicate and the stakes higher.

Small member states, such as Ireland, value a strong commission dedicated to pursuing the common European interest yet the next commission risks finding itself relegated to the role of an executive secretariat serving a more political council or parliament.

The antidote to this risk will be found in a strong self-belief that its mission is political and not merely administrative. It will need to develop a solid working relationship with the European Parliament as a natural but not uncritical strategic ally and new structures and methods to connect to national parliaments.

As drafted, the Lisbon Treaty proposed a smaller commission with fewer than one member from each state precisely to reinvigorate this sense of common European purpose. Ireland’s price for a second referendum restored a commissioner from each state and altered this carefully constructed balance.

This greater legitimacy now needs to be complemented by engendering a stronger sense of common purpose and collegiality.

Empowering a number of vice presidents to lead policy clusters around its strategic goals, in addition to the high representative for foreign policy who will be a vice president, would be a powerful declaration of intent to strengthen the commission from within in order to reinforce its political standing in the new order. Having European convictions and the courage to promote them will be crucial to securing its mandate from the European Parliament. Vital to its credibility with the council, on the other hand, will be its ability to strike a balance between policy aspirations and capacity to act.

Debate on internal policies will be dominated by how to consolidate the fragile economic recovery; how to restore credibility to the banking and financial system; how to harness the welcome emphasis on a low-carbon economy to ensure sustainable growth; how to shape a budgetary strategy fit for future purpose and how to innovate social and economic policy to deliver tomorrow’s jobs.

The critical external policy challenge post- Lisbon will be realising the EU’s weight in the world in terms of commercial, development and security policies. The key to success will lie in a level of ambition that seeks to do enough, well and in depth, rather than too much, poorly and thinly.

Pat Cox is a former president of the European Parliament. He was a leading campaigner for the Yes side in the second Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign and has been spoken of as a potential European commissioner from Ireland

• Comments Feed

0