Would a tight No vote in Scotland best suit Sinn Féin?

"This is a Rubicon," says Prof John Brewer of Queen's University, Belfast. "Irrespective of a Yes or a No vote in the Scottish independence referendum, the United Kingdom as an identity, as a unit, never will be the same again. That is because the London-centrism of the UK economy and polity has been challenged."

Prof Brewer, who during the summer ran a seminar at Queen's on the implications of the referendum, provides an interesting overview on what the referendum may mean for Northern Ireland, for Ireland generally and, more particularly, for Sinn Féin.

Some of the views of this native of the English-Welsh border area may seem counter-intuitive but on closer inspection they carry an interesting logic. For instance, one would expect that the best result for Sinn Féin's ambitions would be Scotland exiting the United Kingdom.

Such a result – the orthodox thinking goes – would rattle unionists, strengthen republican confidence in its tiocfaidh-ár-lá aspiration and boost Gerry Adams’s call for a Border poll on a united Ireland.

But, contrariwise, Prof Brewer argues that a fairly tight No vote would better suit Sinn Féin than a Yes result.

Prof Brewer, who is professor of post-conflict studies at Queen's, says that a Yes vote would lead to the devolution of greater power to Wales and to Northern Ireland. "But I think a marginal No vote will have exactly the same political implications. A marginal No vote is going to cause the London-centric, Westminster- bubble politicians to devolve greater powers."

Expanding on why he believes a marginal No would suit Sinn Féin’s “long game” objectives, he says it’s all to do with the party’s need to attract a middle-class vote, both in the North and the South.

Four out of five jobs in Northern Ireland, he adds, are funded by the British public exchequer. “You are talking about teachers, civil servants, police officers, fire officers, the lot . . . that is a huge, huge distorted economy. It is that fact that gives us what is colloquially known as Catholic economic unionists, the Catholic middle class.”

He believes both middle-class Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland know there could be a lot to lose by the fracturing of the UK.

Cosmopolitan lifestyle “They know that the British exchequer – the British taxpayer – funds their very, very attractive cosmopolitan lifestyle. Look at what we have got in Belfast. Two opera houses – the Grand Opera House and the Waterfront – eight or nine theatres, a world class orchestra, riverside apartments and cafes, brilliant restaurants – it is an exceedingly cosmopolitan lifestyle. There are many Catholics and Protestants who have bought into that cosmopolitanism.”

This is an important constituency, he says, and it does not want to lose these benefits. He adds that he focuses on the importance of the middle classes because Sinn Féin already has mopped up much of the working-class nationalist and republican vote in the North and that its expansion and continued success on both sides of the Border demands it reaches out to this vital bloc of voters.

“This comes back to the rise of the Catholic middle class in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin have succeeded because they have convinced middle-class Catholics to vote Sinn Féin. They have recognised that violence puts off middle-class Catholics from voting Sinn Féin. They also recognise pushing the rhetoric of a united Ireland puts middle-class Catholics off voting Sinn Féin,” he says.

While this view clashes with Gerry Adams’s repeated calls for a Border poll, Prof Brewer believes there is a measure of political gamesmanship to these demands. “Being so politically astute, Sinn Féin have to realise that a Yes vote in the Scottish referendum will require them to up the stakes on a united Ireland. That runs the risk of alienating middle-class Catholics.”

The trick now is to persuade the Southern middle class to vote Sinn Féin, he continues. Such persuasion may hinge on Sinn Féin demonstrating by example in Northern Ireland that it could be a party of government in the Republic.

Extra power “Sinn Féin has yet to establish itself as a credible alternative government in the South. They have not yet made the transition but they have made that transition in the North.

“One of the problems Sinn Féin faces is that the South does not want a united Ireland. People might want it emotionally after a Guinness on a Friday night but they don’t want it politically and they don’t want it economically. They don’t want to inherit a completely dysfunctional economy; they don’t want to inherit a July Twelfth parading problem.”

He notes too how with the rise of the Catholic population it is perfectly possible that in some forthcoming Assembly election that Sinn Féin rather than the DUP could be the majority party with the right to appoint a Sinn Féin first minister.

“Being in government, perhaps even having a First Minister, will demonstrate to voters in the South that it can be a responsible government and I think that will have huge implications for the way people in the South view Sinn Féin.”

But Prof Brewer acknowledges the fly in the ointment here: that such are the tensions between the DUP and Sinn Féin in the Northern Executive, that such is the gridlock over issues such as welfare reform, parades, the past and flags that no sensible government would offer additional “devo-max” powers to Stormont. “You can’t give greater powers to dysfunctional politicians,” he says.

But, equally, he argues that the prospect of extra power could be the incentive that spurs Northern politicians to return to a properly functioning Northern Executive. “The message from the governments has to be: if you want corporation tax at the same rate as the South, if you want devolution max well then sort yourselves out, agree parading, agree all the difficult legacy issues,” says Prof Brewer.

A tight result, he adds, could also create the conditions where the British and Irish governments would start pressurising the Northern parties, particularly the DUP and Sinn Féin, to strike a workable compromise.