Roots of Anglo-Irish Agreement well hidden in talks deadlock, 1984 papers show

Expectations for a breakthrough in Anglo-Irish relations were both raised and disappointed in 1984, as secret negotiations between Dublin and London began in February but nearly collapsed in acrimony by the end of the year. It would leave the emotions of both prime minister Margaret Thatcher and taoiseach Garret FitzGerald running high.

Details of the secret talks,
in which the origins of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of
1985 can be traced, have been revealed for the first time
in official papers released
in the UK National Archives
in London.

The UK is moving from a 30- to a 20-year embargo on state papers, meaning that the documents are one year ahead of those released last week in Ireland for 1983.

The new papers reveal that the Irish government offered to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution in 1984, 14 years before this happened as part of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. However, an increase in the potency of IRA violence, including the Brighton bomb that nearly killed Thatcher on October 14th, 1984, threatened to derail the negotiations at a critical stage.

Both London and Dublin began the year concerned about the future of moderate nationalism in Northern Ireland, fearing that the SDLP might be losing electoral ground to Sinn Féin. Secretary of state for Northern Ireland Jim Prior claimed the SDLP had "lost its way" following the marginalisation of Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin and its shift towards a more assertive nationalist position under John Hume. Minister for foreign affairs Peter Barry defended the SDLP leadership as
"the bravest politicians he
knew", but admitted they
were "tired men".

New initiative
The plight of the SDLP, combined with a resurgence in IRA violence, prompted Thatcher to consider a new initiative to "isolate the terrorists", at a meeting with senior officials in Downing Street on February 10th,
1984. Six days later, her
cabinet secretary Sir Robert Armstrong was authorised to make a secret "informal, confidential and strictly exploratory approach" to his Irish counterpart, Dermot Nally, to explore options.

Despite concerns that such negotiations would “raise unjustified expectations and fears in the Province”, it was agreed “the present situation there was so bad that it would be wrong not to explore the possibilities for change.” Talks were to be conducted on the grounds they were the “least unpromising way forward”.

The British remained unenthusiastic about the New Ireland Forum that had been convened in Dublin by FitzGerald, in co-operation with Hume, in 1983, to seek new ways forward in the North. When they were passed early drafts of the forum report, due to be published in April 1984, they described it as “tendentious”, “disappointing”, “rhetorical and thin on practicalities”. Senior civil servant David Goodall felt that FitzGerald had paid a “heavy price” to keep Charles Haughey on board in the discussions.

Energies were instead focused on the direct negotiations between the two governments that explored a possible joint declaration on Northern Ireland. In May, Irish officials produced a document that raised the prospect of a political “joint authority”, together with joint command of military and police forces.

Thatcher vetoed these suggestions as “unacceptable”. Nevertheless, in a softening of tone from previous years, she was prepared to consider some significant concessions. These included closer cross-Border links, all-Ireland commissions for law and trade, and even “adjustments to the Border”.

In return, she was insistent the Irish clearly recognise Northern Ireland’s position within the UK and fully accept the principle of consent within Northern Ireland. Power-sharing was also off the table as it was “anathema” to unionists.

After Thatcher’s position was relayed to the Irish government, the British appear to have been genuinely surprised when the Irish came back with a bold counter-offer: to abandon the territorial claim to Northern Ireland in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, as part of a broad deal.

Sceptical
While the British acknowledged the significance of the offer, they were sceptical about how realistic it was, for two reasons. Firstly, they judged that the Irish would hope to extract a "high political price" for such a move. Secondly, and more importantly, they doubted that FitzGerald would be able to win a referendum on constitutional change. Indeed, one of the reasons Sir Robert Armstrong was so eager to preserve the secrecy of the talks was because he thought they were so explosive they could bring down the FitzGerald government.

As talks continued into August, the differences between the two sides crystallised. The Irish government sought the restructuring of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and shared authority over Northern Ireland. As Jim Prior noted, however, the most the British could accept was a “consultative role . . . offering influence rather than shared authority”. When Thatcher met FitzGerald on EU business in Fointainebleu in June, she underlined her refusal to accept anything that derogated from British sovereignty in Northern Ireland.

By the autumn, Thatcher was already taking a harder line. She began to raise her concerns about the impact of the negotiations on unionist opinion in Northern Ireland. On October 10th she asked her officials to push the Irish for tougher language on the principle of consent.

Two days later, on October 12th, 1984, the situation was transformed as five people were killed and Thatcher narrowly escaped death when an IRA bomb exploded at the Conservative party conference in Brighton.

Thatcher’s mood immediately hardened, as she told her officials that “the events of Thursday night at Brighton mean that we must go very slow on these talks if not stop them. It could look as if we were bombed into making concessions to the Republic”.

By October 24th, Thatcher declared she was “very pessimistic” about her summit with FitzGerald, set for mid-November. This view was endorsed by her new secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Douglas Hurd, who described as “rather depressing” one meeting with his Irish counterparts.

Distressed
As British officials sought to reduce Irish expectations, the British embassy in Dublin reported that FitzGerald had become "really distressed" by the new tone coming from London. FitzGerald reiterated the need to give the SDLP something that would help them fight off the challenge of Sinn Féin in the local government elections scheduled for May 1985. Thatcher was also told by officials that FitzGerald would be personally weakened if he failed to achieve anything from the talks. "That is not my problem," wrote Thatcher, in her blue fountain pen.

This was the unpromising background to the summit between the two leaders on November 18th-19th at Chequers. It was to be a bruising encounter – less for what was said in the meetings than for the aftermath.

It was at the press conference at the end of the summit that Thatcher made her famous “out, out, out” speech, in which she abruptly dismissed the three main suggestions put forward by the New Ireland Forum earlier in the year. FitzGerald was subsequently reported to have described Thatcher’s comments as “gratuitously offensive”. As relations soured, Thatcher decided not to send a letter that had been prepared to FitzGerald that thanked him for coming to the summit.

Meanwhile, the British embassy in Dublin judged that FitzGerald’s standing was “now very low”, and that he had been to seen to be “humiliated” by Thatcher. British ambassador Alan Goodison felt that the Irish were “being very emotional about this”, adding that “this emotion is a constant factor in Anglo-Irish relations with which we have to deal”.

In a cabinet meeting on November 27th, there were complaints that the Irish “expected the British government to heal wounds which were largely self-inflicted”. Charles Powell, Thatcher’s private secretary, suggested that the Irish “had dug a hole for themselves by building up quite unrealistic expectations before the summit”.

Nevertheless, Douglas Hurd suggested that it was necessary to find some “soothing language” in order to restore relations. It had been noted too that in spite of some “sharp” words, both the taoiseach and minister for foreign affairs were keen to “start the fence-mending process”.

On December 4th Thatcher made a more conciliatory statement on Anglo-Irish relations that was judged by Goodison to have “undoubtedly relieved the pressure” on FitzGerald.

Mood change
At the start of the year, the British had begun negotiations on the grounds that they were the "least unpromising way forward". By December, Sir Robert Armstrong noted that there had been a change of mood and it might now be "that Ministers would decide to do nothing, because it proved to be less difficult than doing something".

Few would have predicted the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement by November 1985.

John Bew is currently the Henry A Kissinger chair in foreign policy at the John W Kluge Center at the US Library of Congress, Washington DC, and a reader in history at King's College London

Martyn Frampton is senior lecturer in modern history at Queen Mary University of London and is the author of three books on the conflict in Northern Ireland