British forces 'facilitated' UDA murder of Finucane
Sir Desmond referred to the RUC special branch agent Ken Barratt, one of the gunmen who murdered Mr Finucane, and how he was recruited in October 1991 even though he had given a qualified admission to the police that he had murdered the solicitor.
"I am sure that the RUC special branch took a conscious decision to recruit Kenneth Barratt as an agent rather than seek to bring him to justice for his role in the murder of Patrick Finucane," the report says.
"That decision was taken at RUC SB superintendent level, though it is possible that knowledge of Barratt's prima-facie 'admission' and recruitment extended further up the RUC hierarchy."
Sir Desmond said he was also satisfied that a tape recording of Barratt's "admission" in October 1991 "was a deliberate act designed to thwart the RUC CID in its efforts to investigate Barratt in connection with the murder".
The report concludes that two agents who were in the pay of the state at the time were involved in the murder of Mr Finucane. These Brian Nelson and William Stobie.
Sir Desmond said he was firmly of the view that the British army's Force Research Unit was not provided with information from Nelson about the plan to murder the solicitor. He added, however, that the FRU must "bear a degree of responsibility for whatever targetting activity Nelson carried out in his dual role as a UDA intelligence officer and a FRU agent" during the period.
In relation to Stobie who was murdered by the UDA in December 2001 after his trail for the murder of Mr Finucane collapsed, Sir Desmond said he was satisfied Stobie provided the 9mm Browning Pistol that the "UDA hit team" used in the killing.
"I do not, however, believe that Stobie knew that the UDA's target was Patrick Finucane," the report says.
"The intelligence provided by William Stobie after the murder of Patrick Finucane could have led to the recovery of the gun likely to have been used in the murder and the arrest of at least one of the key UDA suspects. I am satisfied that the special branch unjustifiably withheld this critical intelligence from the RUC CID."
Sir Desmond did not believe it was "possible to establish with certainty whether officers proposed Patrick Finucane as a target to UDA members" in Castlereagh interrogation centre. "In the absence of any admissions by the individuals directly involved in the interviews it is clearly not possible to establish what happened with certainty," he said.
He did believe, however, based on circumstantial evidence that it was likely "that an RUC officer or officers" did propose Mr Finucane, along with at least one other individual as a target in Castlereagh on December 8th or 9th, 1988.
