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Trying to look both ways
The North: Charles Haughey's goal of an historic Irish settlement eluded him, writes Denis Coghlan.
'Events" got in the way of Mr Haughey's aspiration to be remembered as a great Irish leader. The Arms Trial of 1970, in which he was acquitted of attempting to import weapons for use in Northern Ireland while Minister for Finance, cast a long shadow over his career and made him forever untouchable to the unionist community and suspect to the British government.
Having tacitly supported physical force republicanism in the aftermath of the Arms Trial - he never condemned the activities or actions of the IRA in the nine years before he became Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fáil in 1979 - his subsequent behaviour alienated republican supporters without gaining new friends.
Mr Haughey appeared as the ultimate pragmatist in pursuit of power: saying one thing in opposition, while doing what was necessary in government. And yet his determination to change the status of relations between British and Ireland and to remodel the "failed political entity" that was Northern Ireland did have an effect. His negotiations with Margaret Thatcher in 1980 helped to raise relations to, in his words, "a new plane" and set in train a process that eventually delivered the Anglo-Irish Agreement. But his ambitions always ran ahead of his ability to deliver. And his response to setbacks and disappointments was often damaging or destructive.
Sacked for his role in attempting to arm Northern republicans in 1970, he persevered with his ambition to become Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fáil. Within five years, as the North exploded into violence, he orchestrated a change in Fianna Fáil policy that called on the British government to encourage the unity of Ireland by agreement and to declare its intention to make an ordered withdrawal from Northern Ireland.
But Mr Haughey modified that approach on becoming Taoiseach. His priority, he said in 1979, would be to secure Irish unity by peaceful means and to maximise border security. For the first time, he condemned the use of violence and the Provisional IRA.
For once, he was fortunate in his timing. His overtures to the British government on the need for a new political initiative coincided with a growing number of British army casualties in the North, increasing security costs and political pressure from the United States. Margaret Thatcher was prepared to listen and at their first summit in May, 1980, she agreed to develop "new and closer political co-operation between the two governments".
But the two leaders were working to very different agendas. And there were still tensions. Efforts by Mrs Thatcher at an internal Northern settlement were blocked by the SDLP with government encouragement, so as to open the way to a broader political initiative. And a thwarted attempt by Mr Haughey to replace Sean Donlon as Irish Ambassador to Washington was seen as a crude move to mollify Sinn Féin and militant Irish-Americans.
Even as Mr Haughey prepared for the Dublin Castle summit of December, 1980, which was to mark the high point of his influence on Anglo/Irish affairs, the seeds of inter-government dissension were being sown at the Maze Prison. Mrs Thatcher's determination to "criminalise" Provisional IRA prisoners, and to strip them of traditional concessions as political prisoners, lit the fuse to hunger-strikes that would eventually leave ten men dead and lose Mr Haughey the 1981 general election.
But that was all in the future. Dublin Castle and its high-powered delegations of British and Irish Ministers promised a new departure. The governments commissioned studies by an Anglo/Irish committee on "possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding". And Mrs Thatcher and Mr Haughey agreed to devote their next meeting to "special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands".
In the heady atmosphere following the summit, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Lenihan, suggested all political options were now open. Mrs Thatcher was not amused. She described a suggestion that the internal government of Northern Ireland and its constitutional status could be affected as "damaging and counter-productive".
Mr Haughey sought to mollify her by publicly drawing attention to his earlier commitment that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only come about with the consent of the majority of the Northern Ireland people. But he still spoke of the "failed political entity" that was Northern Ireland.
As the State's economy crumbled in 1981 and inflation and unemployment rose, Mr Haughey gambled on a General Election. But hunger-strike protesters dogged his campaign. IRA prisoners died and Mr Haughey's public appeals to Mrs Thatcher for concessions fell on deaf ears. Two hunger-strikers were elected to the Dáil, denying Fianna Fáil a majority. Mr Haughey was out of government and had earned the contempt of republicans. He blamed Mrs Thatcher.
In opposition, he returned to hard-line rhetoric. This served to safeguard Fianna Fáil's political flank against the growing influence of Sinn Féin and re-forged its credentials as the republican party of the South. In the process, he excoriated Garret FitzGerald for suggesting there was a need to dismantle sectarian laws in the South and accused him of abandoning an aspiration to unity.
The fall of the FitzGerald government in January, 1982, marked increasing unrest within Fianna Fáil. Mr Haughey's leadership was repeatedly threatened but he survived. Frustration over lack of progress on the North and poor relations with Mrs Thatcher almost certainly encouraged him to criticise her military response to Argentina in the Faulklands War. Ireland's membership of the UN Security Council at the time made its stance particularly galling to London. Anglo/Irish relations went into deep freeze.
When the SDLP proposed the establishment of a Council for a New Ireland in 1983, to examine how peace and stability could be achieved, Mr Haughey was enthusiastic - from the opposition benches - and Dr FitzGerald reluctantly agreed. When the New Ireland Forum reported, Mr Haughey concentrated solely on the preferred option of a unitary state by the major parties and opposed transitional arrangements, such as a federal constitution and joint authority.
This extreme position was eventually to split Fianna Fáil and give birth to the Progressive Democrats. But, before that happened, Mr Haughey was to reject the terms of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, negotiated by Fine Gael and the Labour Party in government with the support of the SDLP. And he promised to repudiate it on return to government. As an indication of his determination, he sent Brian Lenihan to the United States to campaign against it. The Dáil vote on the treaty saw Mary Harney and Des O'Malley vote with the Coalition Government: the Progressive Democrats were born and Mr Haughey became fully focused on saving Fianna Fáil from the blandishments of the new party.
The success of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in giving Irish governments a direct input on behalf of nationalists through the Maryfield Secretariat and the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, caused Mr Haughey to grudgingly accept its provisions when he returned to government in 1987. But he wanted to put his stamp on a wider, more comprehensive treaty. In that regard, he offered direct talks to unionists on a new agreement. And, as John Hume engaged Gerry Adams in pursuit of an inclusive settlement involving republicans, Mr Haughey wooed unionists and encouraged the British government to consider the shape of a comprehensive settlement.
Since then his supporters have lauded those efforts as a harbinger of the Belfast Agreement. But that fails to recognise the transformation of traditional Fianna Fáil policy under Albert Reynolds, when "political consent" was adopted as a necessary part of any Northern settlement.
Because of his political baggage, it is unlikely that Mr Haughey would have been able to act as honest broker to both communities in Northern Ireland, while retaining good relations with the British Government.
Denis Coghlan is former Chief Political Correspondent of The Irish Times.
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