It is naturally politically expedient to make admirable-sounding noises about resolving potential long-term problems when doing so eases a short-term issue, but when fixing a long-term problem creates short-term pressures on the State’s coffers, you might as well just forget about any kind of grand intentions and leave it to fester as usual. That’s what struck me reading the Department of Finance report Replacement Rates and Unemployment, which it published without fanfare on Friday.
The proximity to the Budget suggests that it’s a softening mechanism for some harsh welfare cuts on Wednesday; and that the words “poverty traps” and the avoidance thereof will precede Budget speech references to cuts to jobseeker’s benefit and allowance, a harsher means test for the jobseeker’s allowance and possible changes to rent supplement and one-parent family allowance.
The report considers replacement rates – the percentage of a person’s take-home pay that they would receive in social welfare benefits if they become unemployed. A replacement rate of more than 70 per cent is considered “excessive”, it noted: in other words, it would make the attractions of working somewhat limited. Result: long-term unemployment. The replacement rate should also fall the more you earn; if it doesn’t, something has gone wrong within the tax and benefits system, generating a poverty trap.
On the surface, it all sounds very reasonable: there should be some reward for working. Working full-time should result in higher household income than working part-time. And earning two-thirds of average industrial earnings should mean you have more cash in your pocket than you would do if you were on the national minimum wage.
In practice, however, governments only start talking about the need to avoid poverty traps and “incentivise” participation in the labour market at times when they need to save money, and that tends to happen right about the same point that the labour market is banjaxed. People who depend on welfare payments have their entitlements slashed with the excuse that it’s to encourage them to hunt for jobs that don’t exist (rather than the more honest reason that we’ve completely drained the kitty). It’s like throwing someone into the ocean from a boat with no ropeladder, then puncturing their lifejackets in the apparent hope that it’s the only thing that will make them want to climb back on board.
The case of single parents and the Community Employment (CE) scheme exemplifies the kind of misery that can be caused by applying pure economic concepts such as replacement rates to real life predicaments. According to the Department of Finance, the high replacement rate for recipients of the one-parent family allowance on the CE scheme needs examination. Essentially, what it says is that because the income of single parents on the benefit-assisted CE scheme is more than 70 per cent of that which they would receive in low-paid employment, there is a disincentive to move from the CE scheme back to the regular labour market.
No shit. But it’s not always about money. As Karen Kiernan, director of single parent support/lobby group One Family, says, the CE scheme is popular with single parents because it’s often the only kind of part-time / flexible employment that they can find and survive on. It’s not that there is a “lack of incentive” to move back into the benefit-free mainstream labour market because they would only be marginally better off by doing so. It’s that there’s a lack of opportunity within the mainstream labour market to do work part-time / flexible hours - the kind of hours that by definition are the only ones many lone parents can do.
Even in the good times, this was true. But rather than “incentivise” employers to change this, there now seems to be a strong possibility that the Government will follow the recommendation of the McCarthy report and cancel the entitlement of future CE scheme participants to the one-parent family allowance – it’s a double payment, so goes the argument.
Isn’t there a risk that rather than encouraging single parents to choose the regular labour market over a CE scheme, such a move would simply force single parents to stop participating in work, education and training programmes completely? Rather than removing a poverty trap, it could leave a group of people stuck in long-term unemployment – long after their children have grown up.
Mimimising this risk costs rather than saves money in the short term, so it’s not the kind of long-term issue we officially care about. Hey, we’re out of money. But let’s not let any politician or economist away with pretending they’re deeply concerned about potential poverty traps where it suits them to find them right at the same time as they take steps to guarantee actual, immediate and persistent poverty.